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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases Held for Nos. 82-185, 82-246, 82-259, Boston 
Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP 
No. 82-206, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et 
~ ~ al. 
~ 82-22~Menl]?his Fire Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al. 
I am not sure who should write the "hold memo" on these 
cases. Inasmuch as I prepared the order in the Boston 
Firefighters · cases, I am circulating a memo on the cases 
held for them. 
In these petitions, the Union and the Memphis Fire 
Department challenge the modification of a 1980 consent 
decree on the grounds that the modification impermissibly 
abrogated the operation of a bona fide seniority system. 
In 1974 the City of Memphis entered a consent decree 
with the United States in the context of a suit under Title 
VII, 42 u.s.c. §1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment alleging 
race and sex discrimination in the City's hiring and 
promotion practices. In the decree, the City did not admit 
any illegality, but agreed to specific interim hiring goals 
for lower level workers. The 1980 consent decree at issue 
here was entered in the context of a class action commenced 
in 1977 by respondent Stotts alleging that the Fire 
Department's hiring and promotion policies continued to 
violate Title VII, 42 u.s.c. §1981, and 42 u.s.c. §1983. 
Again, the City did not admit any illegality, but agreed to 
the establishment of specific hiring and promotional goals. 
One year later, the City announced a personnel 
reduction 1.n nonessential services, which was to be 
accomplished in accordance with the last-hired, first-fired 
seniority system contained in the City's memorandum of 
a~ a.-.-d CQ?f sLJ..~ wt-1-t. No . YZ -zoeo 
c~~) 
2. 
understanding with the Union. After an evidentiary hearing, 
at which the petitioner Union was allowed to intervene, the 
District Court modified the decree to enjoin the City from 
applying a layoff pol icy based on seniority insofar as it 
would decrease the percentage of minorities currently 
employed in certain positions in the Fire Department. 
On appeal by the City and the Union, CA6 upheld the 
challenged modification. It reasoned that the District 
Court had authority to modify the decree under either of two 
theories: {1) that the City had undertaken a contractual 
duty under the decree to make reasonable, good faith efforts 
to meet the minority hiring and promotion goals, that 
economic hardship could not excuse performance, and that 
respondent Stotts could compel specific performance of the 
City's obligation; or, {2) that the District Court's 
continuing jurisdiction provided authority for modification 
of the decree in light of changed circumstances. TheCA 
also held that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in modifying the decree in a manner that 
conflicted with the provisions of the seniority system. The 
court cited three possible bases for the District Court's 
authority to supersede the operation of the seniority 
system: {1) the strong policy favoring voluntary settlements 
which is embodied in Title VII; {2) the Supremacy Clause, 
which would permit overriding the seniority provisions if a 
§1983 violation had been established; and {3) the City's 
agreement to the prov1s1on of the decree empowering the 
trial court to enter "such further order as may be necessary 
or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree." 
The petitions present a merits issue similar to that 
which the Court did not reach in the Boston Firefighters 
cases because of the potential mootness problem. One 
relevant difference here, however, is that, unlike the 
Boston Firefighters cases, there has never been either a 
finding or admission that the City violated any federal law. 
These facts make the remedial relief granted by the District 
Court's modification even more questionable than the 
modification in Boston Firefighters. The general problem of 
balancing the need to ensure progress toward affirmative 
action goals and the need to protect the interests of 
innocent third-parties under a seniority system is of 
obvious importance. 
There is one factual difficulty with this case. 
Respondents argued below that no valid seniority rights were 
affected by the modification because the Union's agreement 
3. 
with the City was void as a matter of state law. · The CA 
declined to resolve this question. I do not think this 
difficulty presents a barrier to review at this time. 
Although the CA might be faulted for failing to address a 
potentially dispositive state law issue if the question 
would have avoided resolution of a difficult constitutional 
issue, it appears that the CA rested its decision more on 
federal statutory principles than constitutional principles. 
There is some ambiguity ih this regard, however, since entry 
of the consent decree pretermitted an adjudication of the 
basis of the City's alleged liability. On balance, I think 
the lurking state law question would present at most a basis 
for remanding these cases after this Court's decision on the 
merits. 
( .... , ·' ~ '· 
I recommend the petitions be granted and consolidated. 
Sincerely, 
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understanding with the Union. After an evidentiary hearing, 
at which the petitioner Union was allowed to intervene, the 
District Court modified the decree to enjoin the City from 
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would decrease the percentage of minorities curr~ntly 
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court cited three possible bases for the District Court's 
authority to supersede the operation of the seniority 
system: (1) the strong policy favoring voluntary settlements 
which is embodied in Title VII; (2) the Supremacy Clause, 
which would permit overriding the seniority provisions if a 
§1983 violation had been established; and (3) the City's 
agreement to the provision of the decree empowering the 
trial court to enter "such further order as may be necessary 
or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree." 
The petitions present a merits issue similar to that 
which the Court did not reach in the Boston Firefighters 
cases because of the potential mootness problem. One 
relevant difference here, however, is that, unlike the 
Boston Firefighters cases, there _has ... never been either . a 
findin or admission that the Clty~iolated an r eaerai law. 
These fac s rna e the reme ial relief granted by t e D1strict 
Court's modification even more questionable than the 
modification in Boston Firefighters. The general problem of 
balancing the need to ensure progress toward affirmative 
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affected by the modification because the Union's agreement 
3. 
with the City was void as a matter of state law. · The CA 
declined to resolv e this question. I do not think this 
difficulty presents a barrier to review at this time. 
Although the CA might be faulted for failing to address a 
potentially dispositive state law issue if the question 
would have avoided resolution of a difficult constitutional 
issue, it appears that the Cb rested its decision . more on 
federal statutory princi les than const i tut i onal pr 1nc i p ies. 
There 1s some amo1gu1 y in this regard, however, since entry 
of the consent decree pretermitted an adjudication of the 
basis of the City's alleged liability. On balance, I think 
the lurking state law question would present at most a basis 
for remanding these cases after this Court's decision on the 
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I recommend the petitions be granted and consolidated. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases Held for Nos. 82-185, 82-246, 82-259, Boston 
Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP 
No. 82-206, Firefighters 
~al. 
Memphis Fire 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et 
Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al. 
After I circulated the hold memorandum in these cases, 
I received from the Clerk's Office Respondents' Suggestion 
of Mootness. Respondents argue that there have been similar 
developments to those in the Boston Firefighters case which 
make this case moot. Respondents therefore urge the Court 
to vacate and remand for consideration of mootness. 
According to respondents, who document their 
information only with a Memphis newspaper article, all 
employees previously laid off have been recalled to work. 
All fire officers who were temporarily demoted due to the 
fiscal layoffs, with one exception, have been returned to 
their pre-layoff rank. The one officer who has not been 
restored to his pre-layoff rank was unaffected by the 
District Court's modification because he had the lowest 
seniority of any officer, black or white, in his job 
classification. Further, the City's fiscal year 1984 budget 
makes provision for three new positions in this job 
classification, so even this one officer should be returned 
to his original rank eventually. 
After a response has been received from the 
petitioners, I will circulate a supplemental memorandum to 
the Conference. 
Sincerely, 
C HAM BER S OF 
JU S TI C E SAN D RA DAY O'C ONNOR 
juvrtmt <qourt o-f t4t ~nitth .:§taft% 
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employees previously laid off have been recalled to work. 
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fiscal layoffs, with one exception, have been returned to 
their pre-layoff rank. The one officer who has not been 
restored to his pre-layoff rank was unaffected by the 
District Court's modification because he had the lowest 
seniority of any officer, black or white, in his job 
classification. Further, the City's fiscal year 1984 budget 
makes provision for three new positions in this job 
classification, so even this one officer should be returned 
to his original rank eventually. 
After a response has been received from the 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE .CONFERENCE 
Cases Held for Nos. 82-185, 82-246, 82-259, Boston 
Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP 
No. 82-206, Firefighters 
~al. 
Memphis Fire 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et 
Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al. 
Petitioners have filed a 
Suggestion of Mootness setting 





Petitioners contend that here--unlike the Boston 
Firefighters case, in which the Massachusetts legislation 
proscribed future layoffs of the reinstated employees for 
fiscal reasons--there is absolutely no assurance against 
future layoffs in Memphis for fiscal reasons. In addition, 
respondents have failed to sustain their "heavy" burden, 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979), of 
demonstrating that there is ·no reasonable expectation of 
future layoffs. 
Moreover, the District Court's orders have continuing 
effect; they have not expired by their own terms and impose 
continuing obligations on petitioners. Therefore, as the 
decree is presently interpreted by the District Court, any 
future layoffs would be controlled by the modifications. 
Petitioners also point to the continuing adverse impact 
of the layoffs on affected employees. Although these 
employees have been reinstated, several collateral 
consequences of the layoffs remain. One effect has been to 
render laid-off non-minority firefighters less senior for 
the purpose of future job decisions and entitlements. For 
example, seniority is · a relevant consideration in future 
promotion, and the loss of service time during the layoff 
period has impaired the affected employees' expectations of 
~~t ·r (!r-~ ~~ J~~-~ 
, 





future promotion. Also, those firefighte'rs entitled under 
municipal charter (City of Memphis Charter §67) to promotion 
to the rank of captain after 30 years' service will be 
delayed in their realization of this entitlement. Affected 
employees continue to suffer from the loss of comparative 
seniority for purposes o~ future layoffs and a decreased 
priority in bidding on certain jobs and job transfers. 
Finally, there is _ the loss of pay occasioned by the layoffs. 
Finally, petitioners contend that, even if the Court 
otherwise concludes that this controversy is moot, the Court 
should grant review because the underlying dispute is one 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Because of 
attrition in the ranks of department personnel (through 
retirement, resignations, discharges, and the like), a 
municipality often would be able to reinstate previously 
laid-off employees prior to review of the merits issue. 
Based on the points made by petitioners, it would 
appear that this controversy is not moot under the standards 
set forth in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, supra. The 
two-pronged test of Davis requires that: 
"(1) it can be said with assurance that 'there is 
no reasonable expectation that the alleged 
violation will recur, ••. , and 
"(2) interim relief or events have completely and 
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged 
violation." ~u.s., at 631 (citations omitted). 
~ "\0 
Given the fact that here, unlike the guarantee provided 
by the Massachusetts legislation, there is no apparent 
assurance that the reinstated employees will not be subject 
to future layoffs, I do not think that respondents have met 
their burden of proving that there is no reasonable 
expectation of future layoffs. With respect to the second 
prong of the Davis test, this case is also different from 
the Boston Firefighters situation. There the Massachusetts 
civil service scheme provided that any period of layoff for 
fiscal reasons would not affect seniority status for 
purposes of promotion. The same apparently is not true 
here. ~iven the collateral consequences of the layoffs 
identified by petitioners above, it cannot be said that 
interim events have completely eradicated the effects of the 
alleged violation. 
3. 
In my view, the controversy does not appear moot. I 
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Question Presented 
Whether a trial court may modify a consent decree between a 
municipal employer and a group of black employees to avoid the 
effects of a city-wide layoff conducted on a "last-hired, first-
fired" basis, where the consent decree is silent with respect to 
. --
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Section 703(h) of Title VII (42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(h)) provides, 
in relevant part: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to apply different standards of compensation, 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit 
system, •.. provided that ~  are not the 
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin, •.. " 
Section 706(g) of Title VII (42 u.s.c. §2000e-5(g)) provides, 
in relevant part: 
"No order of the court shall require... the hiring, 
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an em-
ployee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such 
individual was refused admission, suspended, or ex-
pelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was 
suspended or discharged for any reason other than dis-
crimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin or in violation of section 704(a) ." 
B. Facts 
In 1974, the City of Memphis entered into a consent decree 
with the Justice Dep't to settle a Title VII suit. The Justice 
Dep't claimed that the City had been guilty of race and sex dis-
crimination in hiring and promotion for various municipal posi-
tions, including firefighter. The purpose of the 1974 decree was 
to remedy any disadvantage to blacks and women resulting from 
past discrimination. The decree required the City's good faith 
... 
efforts to achieve specified hiring goals. The City expressly 
refused to admit to any misconduct. 
In 1980, the City entered into another consent decree with 
two groups of plaintiffs representing blacks in the Fire Depart-
ment. The consent decree established specific hiring and promo-
tion goals with respect to minority representation in the Fire 
Depart-::: . Th~~ stated that qualified minorities 
should fill at least 50% of all vacancies. The ~tional~ 
indicated that qualified minorities should rece~-or-of all 
promotions. The decree also provided that the trial court would 
retain jurisdiction to make "such further orders as may be neces-
sary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree." 
The decree did not mention the effect it would have on any subse-~ 
quent layoffs or its effect on the City's seniority system. -
Again, the decree contained a disclaimer of any past discrimina-
tion on the part of the City. 
On May 4, 1981, the City announced that it planned to reduce 
the number of city employees in non-essential services in re-
sponse to deficits in the City's budget. The City planned to 
base its layoff policy on the city-wide union seniority of indi-
vidual employees. 1 Under the terms of the layoff plan, 39 fire 
officers would be demoted. Of that group, 23 were black and 14 
1There is a dispute over whether the Union had a legally 
enforceable contract with the City. The provision for the 
seni~em was contained in a "Memorandum of 
Understanding." The CA6 noted that the memorandum might not be 
emforceable under Tenn. law, but the court saw no need to decide 
the question. 679 F.2d, at 564 n.20. 
·. 
of the blacks had recieved their promotions under the consent 
decree. The plan also would have laid off 15 of the 18 blacks 
hired under the consent decree. On the day the plan was an-
nounced, resps obtained a TRO restraining the City from laying 
off or reducing in rank any minority employee in the Memphis Fire 
Department. 
c. 
$. Decisions Below 
After an evidentiary hearing, the TC found that the proposed 
layoffs, with resulting demotions, were circumstances that the 
parties to the consent decree had not anticipated. The TC also 
found that the layoffs and demotions would have a substantial 
retrogressive effect on the gains made in minority hiring that 
had taken place under the consent decrees. Because this was the 
sort of result that the consent decree was intended to avoid, the 
~~-~ u-t I~J>O 
TC modified the 9eoree to minimize the disruptive effect the lay-
-------~--~~4~---
offs would have in the efforts to acheive the goals of the de-
cree. As modified the consent decree would prevent minority 
employment from being affected disproportionately by unanticipat-
ed layoffs. The TC used the modified consent decree as the basis 
of an injunction prohibiting the City from conducting the layoffs 
in a way that would decrease the percentage of black Lieutenants, 
Drivers, Inspectors, and Privates employed in the Memphis Fire - -
Department. 2 The TC ordered the City to submit a new plan that 






would comply with the terms of the injunction. 
The City and the Firefighters Union appealed the TC's deci-
sion. The CA6 affirmed the TC, reasoning that the TC had author-~ 
"--------, 
ity to construe the decree as precluding application of the se-
niority system under either of two theories. First, the CA6 not-
ed that budgetary hardships could not relieve the City of its 
contractual duties to make reasonable, good faith efforts to meet 
the minority hiring and promotion goals. Second, the CA6 pointed 
out that under the terms of the decree, the TC retained jurisdic-
tion to modify the decree to take changed circumstances into ac-
count. The CA6 reasoned that the TC had not abused its discre-
tion by modifying the decree in a way that conflicted with the 
provisions of the City's seniority system. Despite statutory 
provisions that protect bona fide seniority systems, the CA6 
stated that the policy favoring settlement of lawsuits permits a 
TC to further the purpose of a consent decree at the expense of a 
valid seniority system. In the alternative, the CA6 reasoned 
that a TC should be allowed to override a seniority system to 
effectuate the policies underlying Title VII. Finally, the CA6 
opined that the TC could have derived its authority to abrogate 
the seniority system from the clause in the decree that gives the 
TC continuing jurisdiction to carry out the purposes of the de-
cree. 
2The TC later expanded its order to cover Fire Prevention 
Supervisors, Fire Alarm Operators, and Clerk Typists . 
• .. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Petitioners' Contentions 
Petrs contend that the TC should have looked only to the four 
corners of the consent decree in determining whether any modifi-
cation was warranted. To the extent that the decree did not re-
fer to layoffs or to the city-wide seniority system, the TC 
abused its discretion in making modifications. Petrs also main-
tain that the modification ordered was outside the remedial au-
thority of the TC under Title VII. As the petrs read Title VII, 
bona fide seniority systems are protected from any tampering by 
the courts. The TC's action also contravenes the policy behind --
Title VII by punishing innocent white employees solely on the 
basis of their color. Finally, petrs submit that if the deci-
sions of the TC and the CA6 are allowed to stand, it will have a 
chilling effect on the use of consent decrees as a means of 
achieving racial balance in municipal workforces. 
B. Respondent's Contentions 
Resp's first line of defense is that this controversy is moot. 
Resp submits that the preliminary injunction was only intended to 
preserve the status quo established under the consent decree. 
The injunction accomplished that purpose with only minimal ef-
fects on white employees, all of whom have been reinstated. 






situation is unlikely to arise again in Memphis. On the merits, 
resp contends that the Court must find that the TC abused its 
discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction in order to re-
verse the CA6. There was no abuse of discretion because the TC 
only protected the gains that had already been made under the 
consent decree. In doing this, the TC was carrying out the ex-
press purpose of the decree and did not go beyond the four cor-
ners of the document. Resp notes that the TC did not impose a 
race-conscious alternative plan, but allowed the City to adopt 
any plan that would not have a discriminatory impact on blacks. 
Finally, resp argues that abrogation of a bona fide seniority 
system does not violate the letter or spirit of Title VII. 
C. SG's Contentions as amicus 
The SG relies primarily on the strong federal policy in favor 
of bona-fide seniority systems. The SG maintains that the abro-
gation of such a system in favor of individuals who have not 
shown that they were victims of discrimination is a violation of 
Title VII. The SG characterizes the TC's injunction as a "retro-
active effort to confer constructive seniority rights," a result 
/ 
the Court rejected in Teamsters v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 
(1977) • The SG also feels that any attempt to restrict the 
City's employment policies when those policies are based on an 
attempt to discriminate is a violation of Title VII. According 
to the SG the Court will create a constitutional conflict between 
the 5th and 14th Amendments if it affirms the CA6. 
D. Analysis 
1. mootness 
The Court set out the test for determining whether a centro-
versy is live in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 
631 (1979). Under that test the resp must show that: "(1) it can 
be said with assurance that 'there is no reasonable 
expectation ..• ' that the alleged violation will recur, ... , and 
(2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably 
eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." (citations 
omitted). Regarding the possibility of recurrence, the Court 
stated in~urphy v. Hunt, 455 u.s. 478, 482 (1982): "The Court 
has never held that a mere physical or theoretical possibility 
was sufficient to satisfy the test •... If this were true, virtu-
ally any matter of short duration would be reviewable. Rather, 
we have said that there must be a 'reasonable expectation' or a 
'demonstrated probability' that the same controversy will recur 
involving the same complaining party." 3 
Petrs point out that the layoffs in 1981 were the first in 
the 162 year history of Memphis. Petrs maintain that the City is 
now in healthy financial condition and that even if layoffs are 
3Because the complaining party (usually the petr) is the only 
litigant who will try to keep the litigation alive by 
demonstrating the probability of recurrence, this language does 
not really comport with the long-standing rule that the resp has 
a "heavy burden" of showing mootness. United States v. W.T. 




needed the TC would not resort to the same remedy. Resp's argu-
ment is that there are no assurances that future layoffs will not 
recur and prompt the TC to issue another injunction. Unlike the 
Boston Firefighters case of last term, there has been no inter----
vening legislation that guarantees that future fiscal problems in 
Memphis will not result in personnel reductions in the fire de-
partment.4 
I tend to think that the parties have not shown a reasonable 
probability that Memphis will experience more layoffs in the fu-
----------------~~ ~----------------
ture. I feel certain that layoffs will occur raising the same 
issues as this case in some locale, but it is mere speculation to 
assume that they will occur in Memphis. Thus, the first prong of 
the Davis mootness test has been met. 
Because Davis expressly held that both prongs of the test 
must be met before a case becomes moot, you must determine wheth- z-4 
er the City's rehiring of laid off firefighters "irrevocably ~I-' 
1>1/ 
Petrs have~........, eradicated the effects of the alleged ... violation." 
-----------"?'/::.._ <,,, 
4The parties ~isagree on the continuing effect of the TC's 
preliminary injunction. Resp maintains that the TC intended the 
injunction only to apply to the 1981 layoffs and that a new 
injunction would have to be issued to apply to any future 
layoffs. Petrs contend that the preliminary in j unction is still 
in effect and will stay in effect indef i n i tely. Petrs are 
correct in their assertion that the TC d' not limit the scope of 
the injqpc~ ion to the 1981 layoffs. Nor does the lnJunc ve 
a rry sort oi an expiration date. Nevertheless, the TC based the 
injunction on the effect that the original proposed plan would 
have on specific individuals and styled the injunction as 
preliminary rather than permanent. If the need for personnel 
reductions were to reappear, the TC would have to reevaluate the 
need for relief in light of new employmen t s t at i st i cs and the 
effect of any new layoff plan. 
~ 
described three consequences of the injunction that continue to 
affect members of the Memphis Fire Department. First, the white 
firefighters who were laid off for a month in 1981 lost one 
month 1 s worth of seniority to the black firefighters who were 
retained under the injunction. 5 This lost seniority may affect 
those whites in future promotion decisions, job transfer opportu-
nities, and layoff situations. Also, the municipal charter pro-
vides that firefighters are automatically promoted to the rank of 
captain after 30 years of service. The firefighters who lost a 
month 1 s seniority wi 11 have to wait an extra month for their 
automatic promotions. In addition, petrs argue that white 
firefighters who were demoted because of the injunction lost the 
opportunity to take examinations to qualify for promotions. 
Resp tries to rebut each of these contentions. First, resp 
submits that petr City made the choice not to allow laid off 
firefighters to accumulate seniority during the layoff period. 
Resp points out that the injunction does not refer to seniority 
credits during the layoff period and that the City has the power 
to change that result if it wants to. Resp also notes that even 
if the Court reverses the CA6, the laid off workers will not re-
gain their seniority. Regarding the 30 year automatic promotion 
5 In the CA6 petrs also sought compensatory damages, including 
an element of wages lost during the layoff period. The CA6 held 
that non-minority furloughed employees could not recover 
compensatory damages under Title VII. Petrs do not challenge 
this aspect of the CA6 1 s opinion. Had petrs decided to their 
claim for compensatory damages, that claim might constitute a 




policy, resp argues that the policy only applies to firefighters 
hired before September 16, 1976. All the men who were laid off 
were hired between 1979 and 1981. Thus, the injunction affects 
no automatic promotion rights. Finally, resp submits that only 
one promotion examination was given during the period at issue 
and all those firefighters affected by the injunction were eligi-
ble to take the exam. 
Assuming that resp has his facts straight {petrs have not 
filed a reply brief yet), it seems that no continuing adverse 
consequences exist. Presumably, the Court could order the City 
to give those affected by the injunction seniority credits, but 
petrs have not asked for that kind of relief and the City could 
achieve that result more easily on its own. If the Court were 
writing on a clean slate, I would recommend that the case be dis-
missed as moot. The Court may feel that having let the case 
progress this far, it should take this opportunity to decide the 
merits. Although other similar cases are sure to arise, in 
Murphy the Court limited the mootness inquiry to a determination 
of whether the issue will recur with respect "to the complaining 
party." As a result, the temporary nature of layoffs suggests 
that the Court will encounter similar mootness problems in future 
cases. 
2. the merits 
A threshold question is what the proper standard of review 
should be. The parties seem to agree that a reviewing court must 
.. ' 
determine whether the TC abused its discretion in granting a pre-
liminary injunction. To grant an injunction, the TC must find 
that the plaintiffs have a stong possibility of success on the 
merits and that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of the injunction. Presumably, "the merits" in this 
case would be an action to have the consent decree construed or 
modified in such a way that it would prohibit the City's use of 
the seniority system in carrying out a personnel reduction. As 
the CA6 pointed out, the first prong of the test was met because 
resp, in fact, convinced the TC to read the decree as prohibiting 
strict application of the last-hire, first-fire procedure. Al-
though a finding of irreparable harm seems questionable in hind-
sight i.e., all laid off firefighters were rehired rather 
quickly), the TC was justified in thinking that the layoffs would 
be indefinite. Thus, the question becomes whether the form of 
-----. 
the injunction was acceptable. In answering that question, I do 
not think an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropri-
ate. The injunction did more than just preserve the status quo 
while awaiting a trial on the merits. The TC construed the de-
cree and ordered the City to submit a layoff plan that satisfied 
that construction. I think that this aspect of the TC order 
should be subject to ordinary standards of appellate review. 
A consent decree is nothing more than a contract that is sub-
ject to continuing judicial enforcement. In United States v. 
------------------------ --
Armour & Co., 402 u.s. 673 (1971}, the Court discussed the role 




"Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a pur-
pose; rather the parties have purposes, generally op-
posed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies 
as much of those opposing purposes as the respective 
parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. 
For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must 
be discerned within its four corners, and not by refer-
ence to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the 
parties to it. Because the defendent has, by a right 
guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause, the condi-
tions upon which he has given that waiver as it is 
written, and not as it might have been written had the 
plaintiff established his factual claims and legal the-
ories in litigation." Id., at 681-682. 
The parties agree that the decree did not make any express refer-
ence to future layoffs or to the operation of the City's senior-
ity system. Resp nevertheless argues that implicit in the terms 
and goals of the decree is a requirement that the City could not 
backtrack on any progress it had made in minority hiring. Like-
~ wise, the CA6 noted that resp was entitled to ask the TC to use 
\.._,. its equitable powers "to compel compliance with the terms and 
goals of the Decrees." 679 F.2d, at 561. 6 The CA6 reasoned that 
the TC could order specific performance of the City's obligation 
to "employ reasonable, good faith efforts to fulfill the goal of 
increasing minority representation." The CA6 relied on "hornbook 
6Another argument is that the clause in the decree that allows 
the TC to "retain[] jurisdiction of this action for such further 
orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the 
purposes of this decree" permits the TC more latitude in 
construing the decree than that permitted under Armour. This 
argument o~s the fact that the consent decree in Armour 
contained a prov1sion similar to the "retain jurisdiction" clause 
of the the 1980 decree. Paragraph 18 of the Armour decree 
provided that "the court should retain jurisdiction of the case 
'for the purpose of taking such other action or adding to the 
foot of this decree such other relief, if any, as may become 
necessary or appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement of 
this decree.'" 402 u.s., at 676. 
bench memo: Firefjnhters v. Stotts page 15 
?u ~tllM-'1 /;f 
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City's economic hardship would ~ law" for the proposition that the 
j;k~ not excuse non-performance under the decree. 
~ 
The CA6 construction of the decree is questionable. The de-
l\ 
cree provides: "Goals established herein are to be interpreted as J 
objectives which require reasonable, good faith efforts on the _ 
part of the City, and not as rigid quotas." At no time has the 
City expressed its intent to welsh on its committment to increase - - -- - -long-term minority representation in the Fire Department. Resp 
do not allege that the City acted in bad faith 7 and neither the 
TC nor the CA6 made such a finding. Although the CA6 is correct 
in its assertion that economic hardship ordinarily is not a de-
fense to a breach of contract action, economic hardship is rele-
vant in determining whether the City complied with its duty to 
act with reasonableness and good faith. Under the Court's lan-
guage in Armour & Co., the CA6 should have either found an ex-
press reference in the decree to the operation of the seniority 
system or made a finding that the City had acted in bad faith, 
thereby brearching one of the terms of the decree. 
As an alternative to its construction of the decree, the CA6 
found that the TC was entitled to fuocHfy the deere~ in light of - ----- - -"cha';_g_e_d..,..__c_lr-•r- c- u-m-s"7t-a-nces." In United States v. Swift & Co., 286 
u.s. 106, 114-115 (1932), the Court stated that a court can modi-
fy a consent decree only when changed circumstances have turned 
7rn its brief, resp argues that there is no evidence in the 
record that blacks were not discriminated against in the layoffs. 
Resp's Brief, at 62. Th~assertion conflicts with the TC's 
express finding that the City had no discriminatory purpose in 
proposing the layoffs. 
Nc; 
the decree into "an instrument of wrong." While recognizing this 
general principal, the CA6 stated that: "Modification is proper 
where it has been demonstrated in an evidentiary hearing that new 
and unforeseen conditions have created a hardship." 679 F.2d, at 
563. The CA6 went on to find that the proposed layoffs would 
impose an undue hardship on the blacks who had been hired as a 
result of the consent decree. Assuming that the CA6's interpre-
tation of the Swift & Co. rule is correct, the CA6's reasoning 
overlooks the hardship that the TC' s order had on those white 
f i ref igh ter s who were laid off in place of protected blacks. 
Moreover, I have trouble seeing why the advent of fiscal diffi-
culties turned the decree into an "evil device." The layoffs 
might have rendered the decree temporarily inoperable, but the 
~ decree itself had no undesirable effect on resps. Thus, the de-
cree was not transformed into an "instrument of wrong." 
Because I disagree with the CA6's construction and modifica-
tion theories, I would conclude that any remedial action on the 
part of the TC was improper. If you disagree, you must decide 
whether the TC exceeded its equitable remedial authority by cir-
cumventing the City's seniority system. 8 The argument in favor 
of the TC's order is that the TC was only acting under the terms 
8There is some dispute over whether the city-wide seniority ~~ 
system was bona fide. The TC stated in conclusory fashion that 
the system was not bona fide because its effect was 
discriminatory. Petition, at A78. The CA6 disagreed and found 
that the TC erred in ruling the the seniority system was not bona 








of the decree. There are two facets to this argument. The first 
is that the City implicitly consented to this sort of relief by 
entering the decree. This argument, of course, assumes that the 
decree can be construed as imposing a requirement on the City 
that it ~yoff blacks hired pursuant to the terms of the de-
'\ 
cree. Thus, abrogation of the seniority system is necessary to 
carry out the terms of the decree. The City and the Union assert 
that the decree was never intended to have this result and if 
they had known that resp had this result in mind they would not 
have agreed to it. As discussed above, I do not think that the 
decree obligates the City to protect the jobs of blacks hired 
under the terms of the decree against the effects of unforeseen 
layoffs. 
The second facet of resp's argument is that the TC derived 
its remedial authority from a provision of the decree which pro-
vides: "The Court retains jurisdiction of this action for such 
further orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate 
the purposes of this decree." The CA6 reasoned that the TC could 
"use this derivative authority to temporarily override the provi-
sions of the Union's collective bargaining agreement." 679 F.2d, 
at 567. Petrs argue that whatever the derivative authority of 
the TC, it could not order a remedy that would be unavailable 
under Title VII. Petrs view the preliminary injunction as an 
order that the City bestow "constructive seniority" on blacks 
hired under the decree. Petrs assert that an award of "construe-
tive seniority" is prohibited under Title VII where the benefi-
ciaries of the remedy are not victims of discrimination and where 
the use of the seniority system has no discriminatory purpose. 
See 42 u.s.c. §§2000e-2(h) and 2000e-5(g). 
Again, I think that petrs have the better argument. The 
Court has stated that Congress intended Title VII to leave bona 
fide seniority systems in tact even if they had the ef feet of 
~ 
perpetuating discrimination. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 
u.s. 324, 348-355 (1977) and the extensive legislative history 
cited in the Union's brief at 28-40. Furthermore, as you stated 
in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 u.s. 385, 401 (1982) 
(Powell, J., concurring), "a violation of Title VII is a prereq-
uisite to disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority 
system •.. " No violation of Title VII has been established. In 
fact, the City expressly refused to admit to "any violations of 
law, rule, or regulation" in the consent decree. In short, it 
seems ludicrous to me that a TC should be able to impose an 
unconsented to remedy under a provision of a consent decree that 
ll coul~ot impose in a Title VII suit. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The case is moot. If it is not moot, the CA6 should be re-
versed. The lower courts' decisions, whether viewed as construe-
tion or modification of the consent decree were wrong. Even if 
the TC' s reading of the consent decree was proper, it exceeded 
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From: Justice White 
Circulated: JAN 4 '1984 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 82-206 AND 82-229 
FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1784, ~~ 
82-206 
PETIT;ONER ~ 
CARL W. STOTTS ET AL. ~ 1./UW IY( 
MEMPHIS FIRE DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,~ ~ • 
82-229 
PETITIONERS )j /( Uf 
v. . ~ 
CARL W. STOTTS, ETC., ETAL. ht..,'"\ ~ 10 ~{_.ft.) ~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF,.,.-:- 1 _/.. ~ 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ~ vru.-- Jt...!.:...-. 
[January-, 1984] ~~~~. 
JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. -
Petitioners challenge the Court of Appeals' approval of an ~ 
order enjoining the City of Memphis from following its se- ~ 
niority system in determining who must be laid off as a result L/ 6 ~ 
of a budgetary shortfall. Respondents contend that the in- r ~ d:.-
junction was necessary to effectuate the terms of a Title VII ~dA ~ ~ .... '·. 
consent decree in which the City agreed to undertake certain . - · ,-
obligations in order to remedy past hiring and promotional jl~j:=. ~ 
practices. Because we conclude that the order cannot be ,-I( 
justified, either as an effort to enforce the consent decree or ~ 
as a valid modification, we reverse.  
I 
In 1977 respondent Carl Stotts, a black holding the position 
of fire-fighting captain in the Memphis, Tennessee, Fire De-
partment, filed a class action complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The 
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other city officials were engaged in a pattern or practice of 
making hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. §2000e et seq., as well as 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 
1983. The District Court certified the case as a class action 
and consolidated it with an individual action subsequently 
filed by respondent Fred Jones, a black fire-fighting private 
in the Department, who claimed that he had been denied a 
promotion because of his race. Discovery proceeded, settle-
ment negotiations ensued, and in due course, a consent de-
cree was approved and entered by the District Court on April 
25, 1980. 
The stated purpose of the decree was to remedy the hiring 
and promotion practices "of the Department with respect to 
blacks." 679 F. 2d 541, 575-576 (CA6 1982) (Appendix). 
Accordingly, the City agreed to promote 13 named individ-
uals and to provide backpay to 81 employees of the Fire De-
partment. It also adopted the long-term goal of increasing 
the proportion of minority representation in each job classifi-
cation in the Fire Department to approximately the propor-
tion of blacks in the labor force in Shelby County, Tennessee. 
However, the City did not, by agreeing to the decree, admit 
"any violations of law, rule or regulation with respect to the 
allegations" in the complaint. I d., at 57 4. The plaintiffs 
waived any further relief save to enforce the decree, ibid., 
and the District Court retained jurisdiction "for such further 
orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the 
purposes of this decree." I d., at 578. 
The long-term hiring goal outlined in the decree paralleled 
the provisions of a 1974 consent decree, which settled a case 
brought against the City by the United States and which ap-
plied citywide. Like the 1974 decree, the 1980 decree also 
established an interim hiring goal of filling on an annual basis 
50 percent of the job vacancies in the Department with quali-
fied black applicants. The 1980 decree contained an addi-
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tional goal with respect to promotions: the Department was 
to attempt to ensure that 20 percent of the promotions in 
each job classification be given to blacks. Neither decree 
contained rovisions for layoffs or reductio~d 
ne1 er awarded any competitive seniority. e ecree 1. 
did require that for purposes of promotion, transfer, and as- (, 
signment, seniority was to be computed "as the total senior- 1 
ity of that person with the City." !d., at 572. 
In early May, 1981, the City announced that projected 
budget deficits required a reduction of non-essential person-
nel throughout the City Government. Layoffs were to be 
based on the "last hired, first fired" rule under which city-
wide seniority, determined by each employee's length of con-
tinuous service from the latest date of permanent employ-
ment, was the basis for deciding who would be laid off. If a 
senior employee's position were abolished or eliminated, the 
employee could "bump down" to a lower ranking position 
rather than be laid off. As the Court of Appeals later noted, \ 
this layoff policy was adopted ursuant to the seniorit sys-
tem mentione m e 1 decree an . . . incorporated in 
the City'smemoranctum witli1he Union." 679 F. 2d, at 549. 
On May 4, at respondents' request, the District Court en- ,{). C. 
tered a temporary restrai_!!!ng_ order forbidding the' layoff of 
any blacK employee. Tlie Union, which previously had not 
been a party to either of these cases, was permitted to inter-
vene. At the preliminary injunction hearing, it appeared 
that 55 then-filled positions in the Department were to be 
eliminated and that 39 of these positions were filled with em-
ployees having "bumping" rights. It was estimated that 40 
least-senior employees in the fire-fighting bureau of the De-
partment 1 would be laid off and that of these 25 were white 
and 15 black. It also appeared that 56 percent of the em-
1 The Memphis Fire Department is divided into several bureaus, includ-
ing fire-fighting, alarm office, administration, apparatus, maintenance, and 
fire prevention. Of the positions covered by the original injunction, all but 
one were in the fire-fighting bureau. 
~ .. 
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ployees hired in the Department since 1974 had been black 
and that the percentage of black employees had increased 
from approximately 3 or 4 percent in 1974 to llYz percent in 
1980. 
On May 18, the District Court entered an order granting a ..J--L 
preliminary injunction. The District Court noted that the ~.u~~ 
consent decree "did not contemplate the method to be used - -/-- - -
for reduction in rank or lay-off," and that the layoff policy 
was in accordance with the City's seniority system and was 
not adopted with any intent to discriminate. Nonetheless, 
concluding that the proposed layoffs would have a racially 
discriminatory effect and that the seniority system was not a 
bona fide one, the District Court ordered that the City "not 
apply the seniority policy insofar as it will decrease the per-
centage of black lieutentants, drivers, inspectors and pri-
vates that are presently employed .... " On June 23, the 
District Court broadened its order to include three additional 
classifications. A modified layoff plan, aimed at protecting 
black employees in the seven classifications so as to comply 
with the court's order, was presented and approved. Lay-
offs pursuant to the modified plan were then carried out. In 
certain instances, to comply with the injunction, non-minor-
ity employees with more seniority than minority employees 
were laid off or demoted in rank. 2 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af- L ./1 ~ 
firmed despite -its conclusion that the District Court was 
wrong in holding that the City's seniority system was not 
bona fide. 679 F. 2d, at 551 n. 6. Characterizing the princi-
pal isssue as "whether the district court erred in modifying 
the 1980 Decree to prevent minority employment from being 
affected disproportionately by unanticipated layoffs," id., at 
2 The City ultimately laid off 24 privates, three of whom were black. 
Had the seniority system been followed, six blacks would have been among 
the 24 privates laid off. Thus, three, white employees were laid off as a 
direct result of the District Court's order. The number of whites demoted 
as a result of the order is not clear from the record before us. 
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551, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court 
had acted properly. After determining that the decree was 
properly approved in the first instance, the court held that 
the modification was permissible under general contract prin-
ciples because the City "contracted" to provide "a substantial 
increase in the number of minorities in supervisory positions" 
and the layoffs would breach that contract. I d., at 561. Al-
ternatively, the court held that the District Court was au-
thorized to modify the decree because new and unforeseen 
circumstances had created a hardship for one of the parties to 
the decree. Id., at 562-563. Finally, articulating three 
alternate rationales, the court rejected petitioners' argu-
ment that the modification was improper because it conflicted 
with the City's seniority system, which was immunized from 
Title VII attack under § 703(h) of that Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(h). 
The City and the Union filed separate petitions for certio-
rari. The two petitions were granted, -- U. S. --
(1983), and the cases were consolidated for oral argument. 
II 
We deal first with respondents' claim that these cases are 'J1L> /-~ 
moot. They submit that since the white employees laid off 
as a result of the injunction were restored to duty only one 
month after their layoff, and since all others who were de-
moted have now been offered back their old positions, the 
preliminary injunction no longer has any real effect. Peti-
tioners, on the other hand, insist that the case is not moot be-
cause the laid-off white employees lost a month~ paY..,a~d ~e-
. rity that have not been restored. In addition, petitioners 
assert, those who umped own" and accepted lesser posi-
tions in lieu of being laid off will also have backpay claims if 
their demotions were unjustified. These continuing__ im_nacts 
on those affected by the injunction are sufficient to avoid any 
claim of mootness, petitioners argue. We agree. 
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Undoubtedly, not much money and seniority are involved, 
but the amount of money and seniority at stake does not de-
termine mootness. As long as the parties have a concrete 
interest in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot 
notwithstanding the size of the dispute. Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U. S. 486, 496-498 (1969). Moreover, a month's I 
pay is not a negligible item for those affected by the injunc-
tion, and the loss of a month's competitive seniority may later 
determine who gets a promotion, who is entitled to bid for 
transfers or who is first laid off if there is another reduction 
in force. These are matters of substance, it seems to us, and 
enough so to foreclose any claim of mootness. Cf. Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 727, 756 (1976); Pow-
ell v. McCormack, supra, at 496-498; Bond v. Floyd, 385 
U. S. 116, 128 n. 4 (1966). 3 
Respondents' only rejoinder is that the City and the Union 
are at one with respect to these issues and that the City need 
only award or restore whatever backpay and seniority it feels 
the laid-off employees are entitled to. The difficulty with 
this position is that it ignores the reality of the situation. 
Respon<fents insisted on the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion; pursuant to that injunction, which declared the seniority 
system to be invalid, a modified layoff plan was presented 
and approved by the District Court. That plan mandated a 
departure from the seniority system and the layoff and demo-
tion of senior white employees. The Court of Appeals, al-
though vacating the District Court's invalidation of the se-
niority system, affirmed the injunction and the modified plan. 
Unless the Court of Appeals' judgment is set aside, the lay-
offs and demotions of the white employees were in accord-
ance with law. It would be quite unreasonable to expect the 
City to pay out money to which the employees have no legal 
3 Unlike Firefighters Union v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, - U. S. 
- (1983) no intervening state legislation affects the issues in this case. 
Thus, there is no reason to remand the present case for a consideration of 
the effect of that legislation as there was in Boston Firefighters. 
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claim or to take some other action enhancing the relative po-
sition of the affected employees in the work force except pur-
suant to some claim of right. Hence the effects of the order 
obtained at respondent's request have not been "completely 
and irrevocably eradicated," County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 
440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979), and the City and the Union both 
have a real and justifiable interest in having the lawfulness of 
the injunction adjudicated. 4 We therefore turn to that 
question. 
III 
The issue at the heart of this case is whether the District 
Court exc eeded i ts .I!OWers in eii'tering an InJUnction requir-
ing white emPlOYees to b'elaid off, when the otherwise appli-
cable seniority system 6 would have called for the layoff of 
black employees with less seniority. We are convinced that 
the Court of Appeals erred in resolving this issue and in af-
firming the District Court. 
A 
•we thus need not resolve the heavily debated issue of whether these 
cases are not moot because they present issues "capable of repetition, yet 
evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). 
• Respondents contend that the memorandum of understanding between 
the Union and the City is unenforceable under state law, citing Fulenwider 
v. Firefighters Association Local Union 1784, 649 S. W. 2d 268 (Tenn. 
1982). However, the validity of that memorandum under state law is un-
important for purposes of the issues presented in this case. First, the 
Court of Appeals assumed that the memorandum was valid in reaching its 
decision. 679 F. 2d, at 564 n. 20. Since we are reviewing that decision, 
we are free to assume the same. Moreover, even if the memorandum is 
unenforceable, the City's seniority system is still in place. The City uni-
laterally adopted the seniority system citywide in 1973. That policy was 
incorporated into the memorandum of understanding with the Firefighters 
Union in 1975, but its citywide effect, including its application to the Fire 
Department, continues irrespective of the status of the memorandum. 
. ' . 
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tion that because the City was under a general obligation to 
use its best efforts to increase the proportion of blacks on the 
force, it breached the decree by attempting to effectuate a 
layoff policy reducing the percentage of black employees in 
the Department even though such a policy was mandated by 
the seniority system adopted by the City and the Union. A 
variation of this argument is that since the decree permitted 
the District Court to enter any later orders that "may be nec-
essary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this de-
cree," 679 F. 2d, at 578 (Appendix), the City had agreed in 
advance to an injunction against layoffs that would reduce 
the proportion of black employees. We are convinced, how-
ever, that both of these are improvident constructions of the 
consent decree. 
It is to be recalled that the "scope of a consent decree must \ n __.J 
be discerned within its four corners, a na nOtoy ~ce to 0 - ~ 
what rmglifsatlscy £Fie purposes of one of the parties to it" or ~
by what "might have been written had the plaintiff estab- 6 
lished his factual claims and legal theories in litigation." 
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673, 681-682 
(1971). Here, as the District Court reco@i.zed, there is no ~ 
mention ofiayoffs or ~ons within the four corners of the _; ~ •• Jn-. "'J ~ 
Decree; nor is There any suggestion of an intention to depart ,~,-~~-
from the eXIsting semor1ty system or om e 1 y s ar-
range on. e cannot believe that the 
parties to the decree thought that the City would simply dis-
regard its arrangements with the Union and the seniority 
system it was then following. Had there been any intention 
to depart from the seniority plan in the event of layoffs or de-
motions, it is much more reasonable to believe that there 
would have been an express provision to that effect. This is 
particularly true since the decree stated that it was not "in-
tended to conflict with any provisions" of the 1974 decree, 679 
F. 2d, at 574 (Appendix), and since the latter decree ex-
pressly anticipated that the City would recognize seniority, 
id., at 572. It is thus not surprising that when the City 
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anticipated layoffs and demotions, it in the first instance 
faithfully followed its preexisting seniority system, plainly 
having no thought that it had already agreed to depart from 
it. It therefore cannot be said that the express terms of 
the decree contemplated that such an injunction would be 
entered. 
The argument that the injunction was proper because it 
carried out the purposes of the decree is equally unconvinc-
ing. The decree announced that its purpose was "to remedy 
past hiring and promotion practices" of the Department, id., 
at 575-576, and to settle the dispute as to the "appropriate 
and valid procedures for hiring and promotion," id., at 574. 
The decree went on to provide the agreed-upon remedy, but 
as we have indicated, that remedy did not include the dis-
placement of white employees with seniority over blacks. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that the "remedy", 
which it was the purpose of the decree to provide, would not 
exceed the bounds of the remedies that are appropriate 
under Title VII, at least absent some express provision to 
that effect. As our cases have made clear, however, and as 
will be reemphasized below, Title VII protects bona fide se-
niority systems, and it is inappropriate to deny an innocent 
employee the benefits of his seniority in order to provide a 
remedy in a pattern or practice suit such as this. We thus I 
have no doubt that the City considered its system to be valid 
and that it had no intention of departing from it when it 
agreed to the 1980 decree. 
Finally, it must be remembered that neither the Union nor 
the non-minority employees were parties to tiie Su.it when the 
1980 aecree was ent ered. '"Hence the entry of that~ee 
cann ot be sal'tt t<r"inaicate any agreement by them to any of 
its terms. Absent the presence of the Union or the non-mi-
nority employees and an opportunity for them to agree or dis-
agree with any provisions of the decree that might encroach 
on their rights, it seems highly unlikely that the City would 
purport to bargain away non-minority rights under the then-
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existing seniority system. We therefore conclude that the 
injunction does not merely enforce the agreement of the par-
ties as reflected in the consent decree. If the injunction is to 
stand, it must be justified on some other basis. 
B 
The Court of Appeals held that even if the injunction is not 
viewed a~pliance with the terms of the de-
cree, it was still properly entered because the District 
Court had inherent authority to modify the decree when an 
economic crisis unexpec e y reqmre ayo s which, if car-
ried out as the City proposed, would undermine the affirma-
tive action outlined in the decree and impose an undue hard-
ship on respondents. This was true, the court held, even 
though the modification conflicted with a bona fide seniority 
system adopted by the City. The Court of Appeals erred in 
reaching this conclusion. 
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that it is not an unlaw-
ful employment practice to apply different standards of com-
pensabon~ifteren~Orts",or f)i1vileges or eih-
ploent pursuant to a nona fide semorn s stem, provided 
that sue I erences are not t e result of an intention to dis-
criminate because of race. 6 It is clear that the City had a 
seniority system, that its proposed layoff plan conformed to 
that system, and that in making the settlement the City had 
not agreed to award competitive seniority to any minority 
employee whom the City proposed to lay off. The District 
Court held that the City could not follow its seniority system 
in making its proposed layoffs because its proposal was dis-
criminatory in effect and hence not a bona fide plan. Section 
703(h), however, permits the routine application of a senior-
6 Section 703 (h) provides that "it shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona 
fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are not 
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin .... " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 
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ity system absent proof of an intention to discriminate. 
__.,..-!' - J - . Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977). ~
Here, the District Court itself found that the layoff proposal 
was not adopted with the purpose or intent to discriminate on 
the basis of race. Nor had the City in agreeing to the decree 
admitted in any way that it had engaged in intentional dis-
crimination. The Court of Appeals was therefore correct in 
5lisagreeing with the District Court's holding that the layoff 
plan was not a bona fide application of the seniority system, 
and it would appear that the City could not be faulted for 
following the seniority plan expressed in its agreement with 
the Union. The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the 
injunction was proper even though it conflicted with the se-
niority system. This was error. 
To support its position, the Court of Appeals first proposed 
a "settlement" theory, i. e., that the strong policy favoring 
voluntary settlement of Title VII actions permitted consent 
decrees that encroached on seniority systems. But at this 
stage in its opinion, the Court of ApPeals was supporting the 
proposition that even if the injunction was not merely enforc-
ing the agreed-upon terms of the decree, the District Court 
had the authority to modify the decree over the objection of 
one of the parties. The settlement theory, whatever its 
merits might otherwise be, has no application when there is 
no "settlement" with respect to the disputed issue. Here, 
the agreed-upon decree neither awarded competitive senior-
ity to the minority employees nor purported in any way to 
depart from the seniority system. 
A second ground advanced by the Court of Appeals in sup-
port of the conclusion that the injunction could be entered 
notwithstanding its conflict with the seniority system was the 
assertion that "[i]t would be incongruous to hold that the use 
of the preferred means of resolving an employment dis-
crimination action decreases the power of a court to order re-
lief which vindicates the policies embodied within Title VII, 
and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983." 679 F. 2d, at 566. The 
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court concluded that if the allegations in the complaint had 
been proved, the District Court could have entered an order 
overriding the seniority provisions. Therefore, the court 
reasoned, "[t]he trial court had the authority to override the 
Firefighter's Union seniority provisions to effectuate the pur-
pose of the 1980 Decree." 679 F. 2d, at 566. 
The difficulty with this approach is that it overstates the \ 
authority of the trial court to disregard a seniority system in 
fashioning a remedy after a plaintiff has successfully proved 
that an employer has followed a pattern or practice having a 
discriminatory effect on black applicants or employees. If 
individual members of a plaintiff class demonstrate that they 
have been actual victims of the discriminatory practice, they 
may be awarded competitive seniority and given their right-
ful place on the seniority roster. This much is clear from 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 947 (1976) 
an sters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). 
eamst~, however, also made clear tha!_mere m~mb~ship I 
. lSadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seruor-
ity award; eacli" inchvfiiuar mU'st provetna"t Ore o1sc:fiiiiliiatory 
practice had an ImQact on hlm. 431 0. S., at~ This 
conclusiOn impieiilents § 706(g) of Title VII, which prohibits 
a court from ordering the reinstatement or promotion of an 
individual who has not shown that he has been the victim of 
illegal discrimination. 7 Thus, while a court in a Title VII ac-
tion is empowered to "effect restitution, making whole inso-
far as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring," 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764 
(1976), Congress made clear that "[n]o court order can re-
7 Section 706(g) provides that "[n]o order of the court shall require the 
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the 
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the 
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or 
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on 
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of sec-
tion 704(a)." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e--5(g). 
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quire hiring, reinstatement, admission to membership, or 
payment of back pay for anyone who was not discriminated 
against in violation of [Title VII]." 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 
(1964). 8 Even when an individual shows that the discrimina-
tory practice has had an impact on him, he is not automati-
cally entitled to have a non-minority employee laid off to 
make room for him. He may have to wait until a vacancy 
occurs, 9 and if there are non-minority employees on layoff, 
the Court must balance the equities in determining who is en-
titled to the job. Teamsters, supra, 431 U. S., at 371-376. 
See also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 236-240 
(1982). Here, there was no finding that any of the blacks I 
protected from layoff had been a victim of discrimination and 
no award of competitive seniority to any of them. Nor had 
the parties in formulating the consent decree purported to 
identify any specific employee entitled to particular relief 
other than those listed in the exhibits attached to the decree. 
It therefore seems to us that the Court of Appeals imposed 
on the parties as an adjunct of settlement something that 
could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and 
the plaintiffs prevailed. This holding plainly ignores 
8 The quoted portion of the Congressional Record is from a interpretive 
memorandum entered into the Record by Senators Clark and Case, the bi-
partisan "captains" of Title VII. We have recognized the authoritative na-
ture of that memorandum. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 
63, 73 (1982); Teamsters, supra, 431 U. S., at 352. Similar assurances 
about the limits on a court's remedial authority under Title VII were pro-
vided by supporters of the bill throughout the Senate debate. 110 Cong. 
Rec. 6566 (1964); !d., at 6548 (Remarks of Sen. Humphrey); !d., at 6563 
(Remarks of Senator Kuchel); !d., at 11847 (Remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 
!d., at 14465. 
9 Lower courts have uniformly held that relief for actual victims does 
not extend to bumping employees previously occupying jobs. See e. g., 
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 267 (CA4 1976); Local 
189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F. 2d 
980, 988 (CA5 1969). 
.. . 
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§§ 703(h) and 706(g). 10 
Finally, the Court of Appeals was of the view that the Dis-
trict Court ordered no more than that which the City unilat-
erally could have done by way of adopting an affirmative ac-
tion program. Whether the City, a public employer, could 
have taken this course without violating the law is an issue 
we need not decide. The fact is that in this case the City 
took no such action and that the modification of the decree 
was imposed over its objection. 11 
We thus are unable to agree either that the preliminary in-
junction was a justifiable effort to enforce the terms of the 
decree to which the City had agreed or that it was a legiti-
mate modification of the decree that could be imposed on the 
City without its consent. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
10 Neither does it suffice to rely on the District Court's remedial author-
ity under §§ 1981 and 1983. Under those sections relief is authorized only 
when there is proof or admission of intentional discrimination. Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976); General Building Contractors Associa-
tion v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375 (1982). Neither precondition was sat-
isfied here. 
11 The Court of Appeals also suggested that under United States v. Swift 
& Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114-115 (1932), the decree properly was modified 
pursuant to the District Court's equity jurisdiction. But Swift cannot be 
read as authorizing a court to impose a modification of a decree that runs 
counter to statutory policy, here §§ 703(h) and 706(g) of Title VII. 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.in.vrtmt Qfltllri oJ t4t ~ttittb jtzdt.tr 
JluJrittgton. ~. Of. 21l~l!~ 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
January 4, 1984 
No. 82-206 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 
v. Stotts 
No. 82-229 Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts 
Dear Byron, 




Copies to the Conference 
' . 
~uvumc (!Jonrt ctf tqt ~niub .§tatcs 
2lU as !p:n:{lhm. ~ . <q. 20 c?JI. .;l / 
CHAMBE:RS OF" January 4, 1984 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 82-206 - Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts 
No. 82-229 - Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts 
Dear Byron: 









January 5, 1.984 
82-206 Firefighters Local v. Stotts 
Dear Byron: 
Please join mP.. 
Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sinc~rely, 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.ilt.p:ftlttt Qf01trl ttf tlft ~tb .Stait• 
'cJ*Z«Jqingfctt. ~. QJ:. 2ilgt~~ 
January 5, 1984 
Re: No. 82-206) Firefighters Local Union No. 1784. v. 
) Stotts 
82-229) Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts 
Dear Byron: 










JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
i'Ulfrtntt <!fttUri 4tf tlft ~~ ,i\hdtg 
~-.lfinghtn. ~. Of. 2.0.;i,.~ 
January 5, 1984 
Re: 83-206; 82-229 - Firefighters Local 
v. Stotts 
Dear Byron: 
Although I expect to JOln the judgment, I will 
probably write separately and may wait to see what 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.iu:prtutt <!fond of tqt ~t~ .itatts 
WasJringhtn. ~. <!f. 2ll,?.l!~ 
..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 5, · 1984 
Re: Nos. 82-206 and 229-Firefighters Local. Union 
No. 1784 v. Stotts and Memphis Fire Dept. v." . 
Stotts 
Dear Byron: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!IERS Of' 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
.Bu.p:rmu Clf&nttt Df tJrt ~a .Statts 
._,..lfi:nght~ ~. Of. 20p,.~ 
January 31, 1984 
Re: (82-206 - Firefighters Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et al. 
( 





Copies to the Conference 
Y 
~ ~ ~ ' ,'..._ . \-. ': The Chief Justice 
e'\11. Q.., • ""~ ~~~~ ' Justice Brennan 
~b \\ ()1. -T \ ' l ~ -\- . \0 Justice White 
~Q....N t.A.  0 \ ~~~ QJ~ ~ TI f\ Justice Marshall 
'\ , ~. . . ~ \l _ \ _ ~ Justice Powell ~ ~~ \N~\. ~ ~ ~ " JusticeRehnquist 
_ ~ , • ~ , Justice Stevens 
 ~~~ \\J ~~ ~~~C ~ JusticeO'Con~or 
~~ ... ~ ~~ ~ ~ a.~~ 1\~rom: Justice Blackmun 
c..\ ~ ~~~~-\~ ~~ ~ \ '-.) Circulated: MAR 2 1984 
" ) · ~ ~ · ~-- ~ ~ \H-. 61~ Recirculated: ____ _ _ __ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES H 
!jfo /)--~ NOS. 82-206 AND 82-229 





CARL W. STOTTS ET AL. 
MEMPHIS FIRE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
CARL w. STOTTS, ETC.' ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[March-, 1984] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
Today's opinion is troubling less for the law it creates than 
for the law it ignores. The Court rejects respondents' claim 
that these cases are moot because the Court concludes there 
is a live dispute between the city and the union over backpay 
and seniority for union members laid off by the city. The 
Court appears to be oblivious, however, to respondents' lack 
of adversarial interest in that issue, and to the Article III re-
striction that limits the jurisdiction of this Court to cases in-
volving adverse parties. Having improperly asserted juris-
diction, the Court then ignores the proper standard of 
review. The District Court's action was a preliminary in-
junction reviewable only on an abuse of discretion standard; 
the Court treats the action as a permanent injunction and de-
cides the merits, even though the District Court has not yet 
had an opportunity to do so. On the merits, the Court ig-
nores the prior decisions of this Court that make inapplicable 
the very provisions of Title VII on which the Court relies. 
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Because the Court's decision is demonstrably in error, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
I 
Mootness. "The usual rule in federal cases is that an ac-
tual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certio-
rari review and not simply at the date the action is initiated." 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In the absence of a 
live controversy, the constitutional requirement of a "case" 
or "controversy," see U. S. Const., Art. III, deprives a fed-
eral court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, a case, although live 
at the start, becomes moot when intervening acts destroy the 
interest of a party to the adjudication. DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974). In such a situation, the fed-
eral practice is to vacate the judgment and remand the case 
with a direction to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, 
Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950). 
Application of these principles to the present cases is 
straightforward. The controversy underlying the suits is 
whether the city of Memphis' proposed layoff plan violated 
the 1980 consent decree. The District Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction limiting the proportion of Negroes that 
the city could layoff as part of its efforts to solve its fiscal 
problems. Because of the injunction, the city chose instead 
to reduce its workforce according to a modified layoff plan 
under which some whites were laid off despite their greater 
seniority than the blacks protected by the preliminary injunc-
tion. Since the preliminary injunction was entered, how-
ever, the layoffs all have terminated and the city has taken 
back every one of the workers laid off pursuant to the modi-
fied plan. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction no longer 
restrains the city's conduct, and the adverse relationship be-
tween the opposing parties is completely gone. A ruling in 
this situation thus becomes wholly advisory, and ignores the 
basic duty of this Court "'to decide actual controversies by a 
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give 
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opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to 
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the mat-
ter in issue in the case before it."' Oil Workers v. Missouri, 
361 U. S. 363, 367 (1960), quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 
651, 653 (1895). The proper disposition, therefore, is to va-
cate the judgment and remand the cases with directions to 
dismiss them as moot. 1 
In its struggle to resurrect a controversy on which to base 
its jurisdiction, the Court focuses on the wages and seniority 
lost by white employees during the period of their layoffs-
and it is undisputed that some such pay and seniority were 
lost. The Court does not suggest, however, and cannot so 
suggest, that its decision today will provide the affected 
workers with any backpay or seniority. It is clear that any 
such backpay or retroactive seniority for laid-off workers 
1 Because the Court finds that the backpay issue keeps these cases alive, 
it does not consider whether the controversy is also alive, as petitioners 
urge, because it falls into that narrow category of cases that are "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). I need mention that suggestion only 
briefly. 
Any contention that the issues in this litigation "evade review" is belied 
by the facts. The petitions for certiorari were filed on August 4 and 5, 
1982. The last demoted Memphis firefighter was restored to his position 
in June 1983. Until the demotions ended, the cases remained alive be-
cause the preliminary injunction kept blacks employed in positions that the 
city otherwise would have filled with whites. In the normal course of 
events, a case brought here by a petition filed in August 1982 almost cer-
tainly would have been decided during the Court's 1982 Term, prior to the 
end of the demotions. The only reason that these cases were not decided 
on that schedule is that this Court withheld ruling pending disposition of 
Boston Firefighters Union v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, -- U. S. --
(1983), which presented a similar issue. Were layoffs identical to those in 
these cases to occur again in Memphis, the issue would evade review only if 
there were, once again, a reason for this Court to delay consideration of the 
issue. It is not realistic to suggest that the likelihood of that scenario is 
sufficient to bring these cases into the category of cases kept alive because 
by their nature they "evade review." 
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would have to come from the city, not from respondents. 2 
But both the city and the union are petitioners here, not ad-
versaries, and respondents have no interest in defending the 
Court of Appeals' judgment simply to protect the city from 
liability to the union in a separate proceeding. For that rea-
son, these suits involve the wrong adverse parties for resolu-
tion of any issues of backpay and seniority. 
The Court acknowledges, moreover, that neither the pre-
liminary injunction nor the Cop.rt of Appeals' judgment pro-
hibits the city from awarding to the workers affected by the 
layoffs whatever backpay and seniority it feels they deserve. 
See ante, at 6--7. The city is free to make a voluntary award 
of backpay or seniority without a ruling from this Court. 
Any award of backpay and seniority that the union will obtain 
through adjudication must come in a separate suit against the 
city. Thus, today's decision does not provide any relief in 
the very controversy on which the Court bases its jurisdic-
tion-a tell-tale sign of an advisory opinion. 
The Court, nevertheless, suggests that the backpay and 
seniority issues somehow keep these cases alive despite the 
absence of an adversarial party. 3 The Court states: 
2 In the event that the laid off firefighters were to bring a successful ac-
tion for backpay against the city, the city would have no claim for re-
imbursement against respondents for securing an allegedly erroneous in-
junction. No bond was posted for the preliminary injunction, and "[a] 
party injured by the issuance of an injunction later determined to be erro-
neous has no action for damages in the absence of a bond." W. R. Grace & 
Co. v. Local Union 759, -- U. S. --, --, n. 14 (1983). 
3 Today's decision, of course, disposes of two cases-one brought here 
by the city and others, and the second by the union-that were consoli-
dated below. The Court's conclusion that the backpay and seniority issues 
keep the controversy live, however, presumably applies only to the suit be-
tween respondents and the union because its premise is that the city will 
assert the validity of the preliminary injunction as a defense in a backpay 
claim brought by the union against the city. If the city would defend the 
validity of the preliminary injunction in a backpay suit, such a suit presum-
ably cannot keep alive the attack on the validity of the preliminary injunc-
tion in this proceeding. At a minimum, therefore, the Court must concede 
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"Unless the Court of Appeals' judgment is set aside, the 
layoffs and demotions of the white employees were in ac-
cordance with law. It would be quite unreasonable to 
expect the city to pay out money to which the employees 
have no legal claim or to take some other action enhanc-
ing the relative position of the affected employees in the 
work force except pursuant to some claim of right." 
Ante, at 6--7. 
Although the artful ambiguity of this passage renders it ca-
pable of two interpretations, neither provides a basis on 
which to conclude that these cases are not moot. The Court 
may mean to suggest that the city has no legal obligation to 
provide backpay and retroactive seniority, but that it might 
voluntarily do so if this Court opines that the preliminary in-
junction was improper. A decision in that situation, how-
ever, would be an advisory opinion in the fullest sense-it 
would not require the city to do anything. One must assume 
that the Court has something else in mind, because it gives 
no indication that it no longer feels constrained by the Article 
III prohibition on rendering advisory opinions that has been 
recognized in the federal · courts for almost 200 years. See 
Rayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), as interpreted in Musk-
rat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 351-353 (1911). 
It is more likely that the Court means to suggest that if the 
Court of Appeals' judgment is left standing, it would have 
some kind of preclusive effect in a subsequent suit for back 
pay and retroactive seniority brought by the union against 
the city. Even assuming arguendo that the Court is cor-
rect-which it is not 4-its point is manifestly irrelevant to 
that the controversy between the city and respondents, No. 82-229, is 
moot. 
' I am at somewhat of a loss trying to understand the Court's suggestion 
that the District Court's preliminary injunction prevented contract liability 
from arising between the city and the affected white employees. As is ex-
plained more fully, infra, the preliminary injunction did not require the 
city to layoff anyone. The preliminary injunction merely prohibited the 
·,. 
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the mootness issue. As mentioned above, this Court's long-
standing treatment of cases that are moot is to vacate the 
judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss. 5 This 
practice arose in response to precisely the concern that the 
Court now expresses over the effect of the Court of Appeals' 
judgment in these cases. As explained in Munsingwear, 
supra: 
"The established practice of the Court in dealing with a 
civil case from a court in the federal system which has 
become moot while on its way here or pending our deci-
sion on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment 
below and remand with a direction to dismiss. That was 
said in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 
259, 267, to be 'the duty of the appellate court.' That 
procedure clears the path for future relitigation of the is-
sues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, re-
view of which was prevented through happenstance. 
When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties 
are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in 
the statutory scheme was only preliminary." 340 
U. S., at 39 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Until today, therefore, it has been the rule that a case 
pending here is not kept alive because it contains issues that 
city from laying off more than a certain proportion of blacks. In the face of 
that constraint, the city decided to proceed with layoffs and to lay off 
whites instead of the protected blacks. If in so doing the city breached 
contractual rights of the white employees, those rights remained enforce-
able. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, supra (employer could 
be held liable for breach of collective bargaining agreement when, because 
women employees were protected by an injunction, it laid off male employ-
ees with greater seniority). 
5 The Court has followed this practice for at least 90 years. See New 
Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 161 U. S. 101, 103 (1896), modifying 
160 U.S. 170 (1895). See also Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 
U. S. 92 (1979); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395 (1975); Parker v. Ellis, 
362 U. S. 574 (1960); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259, 
267 (1936). 
82-206 & 82-229-DISSENT 
FIREFIGHTERS v. STOTTS 7 
may arise in a different proceeding in another forum. Such 
issues simply are irrelevant to the mootness question, which 
focuses on the adversariness of the opposing parties on the 
issue before the Court. In Oil Workers v. Missouri, supra, 
for example, the Court declined to review an expired 
antistrike injunction issued pursuant to an allegedly uncon-
stitutional state statute, even though the challenged statute 
also governed a monetary penalty claim pending in state 
court against the union. The Court stated: "'[T]hat suit is 
not before us. We have not now jurisdiction of it or its is-
sues. Our power only extends over and is limited by the 
conditions of the case now before us"' (emphasis added). 361 
U. S., at 370, quoting American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 
U. S. 49, 52 (1904). The Court today simply has its reason-
ing backwards. It believes that these cases present a live 
controversy because the judgment will control future litiga-
tion unless "set aside," ante, at 6; yet the chief consequence 
of a determination of mootness would be to "set aside" that 
judgment. 
By going beyond the reach of its Article III powers, to-
day's decision exhibits all the characteristics of an advisory 
opinion. The Court concedes that there is considerable 
doubt whether, in fact, the union possesses any enforceable 
contractual rights. 6 It also is unclear how the propriety of 
6 It appears that if the union enjoys any contractual rights at all, they 
derive from the "Memorandum of Understanding" between the union and 
the city, which indicates that layoffs shall be made on the basis of seniority. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-206, p. A81. The Tennessee Supreme 
Court recently has confirmed, however, that the Memorandum of Under-
standing confers no enforceable rights, Fulenwider v. Firefighters Associ-
ation Local Union 1784, 649 S. W. 2d 268 (1982), because of state law lim-
its on the authority of municipalities to contract with labor organizations. 
Thus, the likely reason that the union has not filed a suit for backpay is 
because it has no enforceable rights. 
The likelihood that there are no such rights provides some explanation 
for the otherwise curious posture of the city in these cases. If the validity 
of the preliminary injunction somehow affects the backpay issue, one would 
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the preliminary injunction would affect the city's defenses to 
a contract claim by the union. 7 In any event, no such claim 
has been filed. The Court thus provides an advisory opinion 
for the union on the theory that it might affect a defense that 
the city has not asserted, in a suit that the union has not 
brought, to enforce contractual rights that may not exist. 8 
expect that the city would try to minimize its liability for backpay by argu-
ing that the injunction was valid. The city's position makes perfect sense, 
however, if one assumes that the union has no enforceable rights, and that 
the city would be seeking only an advisory opinion on the interpretation of 
the consent decree. Such an opinion, however, is precisely what this 
Court always has stated it cannot give. 
7 An enjoined party is required to obey an injunction issued by a federal 
court within its jurisdiction even if the injunction turns out on review to 
have been erroneous. 
"'An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction ... 
served upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must 
be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be, even 
if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law 
going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance to deter-
mine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is re-
versed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its 
orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them 
is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished."' Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307, 314 (1967), quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258 
u. s. 181, 189-190 (1922). 
Given that the city could have been punished for contempt if it had disre-
garded the preliminary injunction, regardless of whether the injunction on 
appeal were found erroneous, it seems unlikely that a defense to a breach 
of contract would turn on whether the preliminary injunction is upheld on 
appeal as opposed to the city's obligation to obey the injunction when 
entered. 
8 The Court's statement that respondents' mootness argument "ignores 
the reality of the situation," ante, at 6, is ironic in view of the Court's reli-
ance on an identical argument last Term in Boston Firefighters Union v. 
Boston Chapter, NAACP, supra. That case concerned layoffs by the Bos-
ton Police and Fire Departments that would have vitiated much of the 
progress made under consent decrees, the purpose of which was to in-
crease minority representation in those Departments. A District Court 
order modified the consent decrees, and enjoined the city from reducing 
minority percentages in its workforce. As a consequence, Boston chose to 
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Assuming arguendo that these cases are justiciable be-
cause of unresolved backpay issues, then the only question 
before the Court is the validity of a preliminary injunction 
that prevented the city from conducting layoffs that would 
have reduced the number of blacks in certain job categories 
within the Memphis Fire Department. In granting such re-
lief, the District Court was required to consider respondents' 
likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of irreparable 
harm to the parties, and whether the injunction would be in 
the public interest. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 
U. S. 390, 392 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 
922, 931 (1975). The question before a reviewing court "is 
simply whether the issuance of the injunction, in light of the 
applicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion." 
!d., at 932. 
layoff white employees in violation of the white employees' rights to he laid 
off on a last-hired-first-fired basis. As in this case, the laid-off white em-
ployees suffered lost wages during the period of their layoffs. Before this 
Court decided the case, however, the layoffs ended and all affected employ-
ees returned to their jobs. Apparently recognizing that the backpay issue 
could not keep alive the dispute over the validity of the District Court's 
injunction, this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for con-
sideration of mootness. The Court offers no sensible explanation for 
treating the mootness issue in this case differently. The contrasting treat-
ment is especially surprising given that in Boston Firefighters the affected 
employees actually had filed backpay claims, whereas in this case any such 
claim remains hypothetical. 
The Court's feeble attempt to distinguish the two cases rests on the 
ground that an intervening statute may have affected the issues in Boston 
Firefighters . See ante, at 6, n. 3. But that statute affected only the like-
lihood of a similar layoff in the future. Its relevance was therefore re-
stricted to the question whether the Boston layoffs were "capable of repe-
tition yet evading review." The intervening statute had nothing to do 
with the backpay issue, and a remand would not have been necessary had 
the backpay issue alone been sufficient to keep the controversy alive. 
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The Court, however, has chosen to answer a different 
question. The Court's opinion does not mention the stand-
ard of review for a preliminary injunction, and does not apply 
that standard to these cases. Instead, the Court treats the 
cases as if they involved a permanent injunction, and ad-
dresses the question whether the city's proposed layoffs vio-
lated the consent decree. That issue was never resolved in 
the District Court because the city did not press for a final 
decision on the merits. The issue, therefore, is not properly 
before this Court. Mter taking jurisdiction over a contro-
versy that no longer is, the Court reviews a decision that 
never was. 
In so doing, the Court does precisely what in Camenisch, 
supra, it unanimously concluded was error. Camenisch in-
volved a suit by a deaf student who claimed that the Univer-
sity of Texas unlawfully had refused to pay for an interpreter 
to assist him in his studies. Finding a possibility that 
Camenisch would suffer irreparable harm and that he was 
likely to prevail on the merits, the District Court granted a 
preliminary injunction requiring the University to provide an 
interpreter pending the outcome of the litigation and requir-
ing Camenisch to post a bond. While appeal of the prelimi-
nary injunction was pending before the Court of Appeals, 
Camenisch graduated. In affirming the District Court's pre-
liminary injunction, the Court of Appeals had rejected 
Camenisch's suggestion that his graduation rendered the 
case moot; there remained the issue whether the University 
or Camenisch should pay the interpreter. This Court 
granted certiorari and vacated and remanded the case to the 
District Court. The Court explained: 
"The Court of Appeals correctly held that the case as a 
whole is not moot, since, as that Court noted, it remains 
to be decided who should ultimately bear the cost of the 
interpreter. However, the issue before the Court of Ap-
peals was not who should pay for the interpreter, but 
rather whether the District Court had abused its discre-
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tion in issuing a preliminary injunction requiring the 
University to pay for him. . . . The two issues are sig-
nificantly different, since whether the preliminary in-
junction should have issued depended on the balance of 
factors [for granting preliminary injunctions], while 
whether the University should ultimately bear the cost of 
the interpreter depends on a final resolution of the mer-
its of Camenisch's case. 
In sum, the question whether a preliminary injunction 
should have been issued here is moot, because the terms 
of the injunction, as modified by the Court of Appeals, 
have been fully and irrevocably carried out. The ques-
tion whether the University must pay for the interpreter 
remains for the trial on the merits. Until such a trial 
has taken place, it would be inappropriate for this Court 
to intimate any view on the merits of the lawsuit" (em-
phasis added). 451 U. S., at 393, 398. 
The case "as a whole" remained live in Camenisch because 
the parties before the Court remained adverse on the issue to 
be resolved at trial; as demonstrated in Part I, supra, such 
adversariness does not exist in this case on the issues of se-
niority and backpay. Putting that difference aside, 
Camenisch confirms that the Court has misunderstood the 
issue now before it in two other respects. First, Camenisch 
makes clear that even if the union's interest in backpay gave 
rise to a continuing controversy, the appropriate disposition 
is a remand for a determination on the merits. The question 
before the Court of Appeals was whether the District Court 
had properly considered the factors relevant to granting a 
preliminary injunction; that question became moot when the 
layoffs ended, just as the propriety of the preliminary injunc-
tion in Camenisch became moot when Camenisch graduated. 
The backpay dispute between the union and the city in these 
cases, like the dispute over who was to pay for the inter-
preter in Camenisch, depends not on the propriety of the 
82-206 & 82-229-DISSENT 
12 FIREFIGHTERS v. STOTTS 
preliminary injunction, but on an ultimate resolution of the 
merits-here, whether the proposed layoffs violated the con-
sent decree. That question never was decided by the Dis-
trict Court and would require a trial on the merits. 
Second, Camenisch demonstrates that a determination of a 
party's entitlement to a preliminary injunction is a separate 
issue from the determination of the merits of the party's un-
derlying legal claim. Even if petitioners' challenge to the 
preliminary injunction were not moot, the only issue before 
this Court would be the propriety of preliminary injunctive 
relief. See, also, New York State Liquor Authority v. 
Bellanca, 452 U. S. 714, 716 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U. S., at 931-932, 934. The Court has chosen to 
answer a different question when it reaches the merits of re-
spondents' claim, a question that simply is not presented by 
the cases in their present posture. It is true, of course, that 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals had to make a 
preliminary evaluation of respondents' likelihood of success 
on the merits, but that evaluation provides no basis for decid-
ing the merits: 
"Since Camenisch's likelihood of success on the merits 
was one of the factors the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals considered in granting Camenisch a preliminary 
injunction, it might be suggested that their decisions 
were tantamount to decisions on the underlying merits 
and thus that the preliminary-injunction issue is not 
truly moot. . . . This reasoning fails, however, because 
it improperly equates 'likelihood of success' with 'suc-
cess,' and what is more important, because it ignores the 
significant procedural differences between preliminary 
and permanent injunctions" (emphasis added). 451 
U. S., at 394. 
Indeed, there simply is no proper factual basis on which 
this Court legitimately can decide the question whether the 
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city's proposed layoffs violated the consent decree. 9 Like 
the proceedings in Camenisch, the proceedings in this litiga-
tion "bear the marks of the haste characteristic of a request 
for a preliminary injunction." I d., at 398. The hearing on 
the preliminary injunction was held four days after the lay-
offs had been announced. With the exception of a single 
deposition held the day before the hearing, there was no dis-
covery. In opening the hearing, the trial judge noted: "One 
of the problems with these injunction hearings centers 
around the fact that the lawyers don't have the usual time to 
develop the issues, and take discovery, and exchange in-
formation, and to call on each other to state what they think 
the issues are . .. I got an idea from the lawyers-! am not 
sure that they were finally decided on what route they were 
going .... " App. 30. It is true that the District Court 
made a few of what generously could be described as findings 
and conclusions, but, as the Court in Camenisch pointed out, 
"findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court grant-
ing a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the 
merits." 451 U. S., at 395. 
I realize that, because the adverse parties on the backpay 
and seniority issues are the city and the union, further pro-
ceedings between the city and respondents would be a mock-
ery of Article III's case or controversy requirement. The 
prospect of such a charade, however, only points out why 
these cases are the wrong ones in which to resolve the issue 
of backpay. Instead of promoting a tennis match with the 
players on the same side of the net, the Court should vacate 
""'the-judgment in these cases and remand them with an in-
structiOn to dismiss. If the union wis hes to seek backpay in 
a suit against the city, it can do so in a proceeding in which 
the parties are adverse. Such a proceeding would be fully 
competent to interpret the consent decree for the purpose of 
9 The facts relevant to these cases certainly are not uncontested. 
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determining what effect, if any, the consent decree has on the 
city's contractual obligations to the union. 
B 
Even on its own terms, the Court's analysis of the District 
Court's preliminary injunction is flawed. The Court's initial 
error lies in its belief that the "issue at the heart of this case" 
is the District Court's power to "enter[] an injunction requir-
ing white employees to be laid off." Ante, at 7. On its face, 
the preliminary injunction prohibited the city from conduct-
ing layoffs in accordance with its seniority system "insofar as 
it will decrease the percentage of blacks" in certain job cate-
gories within the Fire Department. App. to Pet . .for Cert. 
in No. 82-229, p. A80. The preliminary injunction did not 
require the city to lay off any white employees at all. Al-
though the District Court restricted the city's options in 
meeting its fiscal crisis, it did not require that the city dis-
miss white employees on pain of contempt. This distinction 
is critical because, by requiring only that the city's layoffs not 
..\. ~ affect more than a certain proportion of blacks, the District 
o.__' tJ ~ ~ Court did not abrogate the contractual rights of white em-
~ ' ~ fQ.~ployees. The decision to have layoffs instead of meeting its 
~ Q. fiscal problems in a different manner remained the choice of 
the city; if the modified layoff plan abrogated the contractual 
rights of the union, those rights remained enforceable. 10 
That a union's contractual rights could remain enforceable 
despite the preliminary injunction was the unanimous teach-
ing of this Court just last Term in W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
10 Judge Martin's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part from 
the Sixth Circuit's decision is based on precisely this point: 
"I must conclude that the District Court has no authority to abrogate the 
Union's contractual and statutory rights. The Union was not a party to 
this suit when the consent decree was entered. Judge McRae simply en-
joined the City from making its proposed layoffs in the Fire Department. 
Judge McRae's actions do not affect the collectively bargained rights of the 
Union" (emphasis added). 679 F. 2d 541, 569 (1982). 
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Union 759, -- U. S. -- (1983), which presented a situa-
tion remarkably similar to this case. In that case, an em-
ployer concluded that its financial condition necessitated lay-
offs. Its female employees were protected by a court order 
issued pursuant to a consent decree, while its male employ-
ees had seniority rights under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The employer decided to lay off males. The affected 
males obtained awards in grievance proceedings for the 
breach of their collectively bargained rights, which the em-
ployer insisted were unenforceable because of the District 
Court order. This Court made clear that the dilemma faced 
by the employer did not render the male employees' contrac-
tual rights unenforceable: 
"Given the Company's desire to reduce its workforce, 
it is undeniable that the Company was faced with a di-
lemma: it could follow the conciliation agreement as man-
dated by the District Court and risk liability under the 
collective bargaining agreement, or it could follow the 
bargaining agreement and risk both a contempt citation 
and Title VII liability. The dilemma, however, was of 
the Company's own making. The Company committed 
itself voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obliga-
tions." I d., at --. 
It is clear, therefore, that the correctness of the District 
Court's interpretation of the decree is irrelevant with respect 
to the enforceability of the union's contractual rights; those 
rights remained enforceable regardless of whether the city 
had an obligation not to lay off blacks. 11 Despite the Court's 
11 To bolster the impression that the District Court required the layoff of 
whites, the Court speciously focuses on the fact that the District Court "ap-
proved" the city's modified layoff plan under which whites were laid off. 
Ante, at 6. District court approval of the modified plan, as the Court pre-
sumably knows, has no effect whatsoever on the enforceability of the rights 
of affected white employees. The injunction stated that the defendants 
"should file a proposed plan to comply with this Court's injunction." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-229, p. A79. The city was free to propose any 
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efforts, the guestion in these cases remains whether the Dis-
J.rict Court's authority pursuant to the consent decree en-:-
abled it to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the layoff 
c 
In affirming the District Court's preliminary injunction, 
the Court of Appeals suggested at least two grounds on 
which respondents might have prevailed on the merits. The 
first of these derives from the contractual characteristics of a 
consent decree. Because a consent decree "is to be con-
strued for enforcement purposes essentially as a contract," 
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223, 
238 (1975), respondents had the right to specific performance 
of the terms of the decree. If the proposed layoffs violated 
the terms of the decree, the District Court could issue an in-
junction requiring compliance with those terms. Alterna-
tively, the Court of Appeals noted that a court of equity has 
inherent power to modify a consent decree in light of changed 
circumstances. 679 F. 2d 541, 560-561 (1982). Thus, if re-
spondents could show that changed circumstances justified 
modification of the decree, the District Court would have au-
thority to make such a change. The Court fails to address 
either of these grounds in a satisfactory way. 
1 
The District Court's authority to enforce the terms and 
purposes of the consent decree was expressly reserved in the 
plan at all, so long as it did not have the prohibited effect of reducing black 
representation in protected job categories. When the court approved the 
proposed plan, it stated merely that the "proposed plan for conducting the 
contemplated layoffs is in accordance with the preliminary injunction is-
sued May 8, and is therefore approved." I d., at A83. It is simply incor-
rect for this Court to pretend that the District Court's approval of the 
city's modified plan somehow transformed the preliminary injunction from 
one that prohibited the layoff of blacks into one that first required the lay-
off of whites and then immunized the city for any liability that it otherwise 
would incur for such layoffs. 
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decree itself. Paragraph 17 of the decree stated: "The Court 
retains jurisdiction of this action for such further orders as 
may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes 
of this decree." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-229, p. 
A69. It was that provision under which the respondents 
sought the preliminary injunction. See Plaintiff's Supple-
mental Memorandum in Support of a Preliminary Injunction, 
p. 1. The decree obligated the city to provide certain spe-
cific relief to particular individuals, and to pursue a long term 
goal to "raise the black representation in each job classifica-
tion on the fire department to levels approximating the black 
proportion of the civilian labor force in Shelby County." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-229, p. A64. The decree set 
more specific goals for hiring and promotion opportunities as 
well. To meet these goals, the decree "require[d] reason-
able, good faith efforts on the part of the City." Ibid. 
In support of their request for a preliminary injunction, re-
spondents claimed that the proposed layoffs would adversely 
affect blacks significantly out of proportion to their represen-
tation. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of a Prelimi-
nary Injunction, pp. 1-2. They argued that the proposed 
layoffs were "designed to thwart gains made by blacks" 
under the decree. I d., at 2. Their argument emphasized 
that the Mayor had "absolute discretion to choose which job 
classifications" were to be affected by the layoffs, ibid., and 
that the "ranks chosen by the Mayor for demotion are those 
where blacks are represented in the greatest number." Id., 
at 4. Respondents claimed that such a layoff plan "violates 
the spirit of the 1980 Consent Decree." I d., at 3. On the 
basis of these claims and the limited evidence presented at 
the hearing prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunc-
tion, the District Court enjoined the city from laying off 
blacks where the effect would have been to reduce the per-
centage of black representation in certain job categories. 
The purpose of the injunction was not to announce the Dis-
trict Court's final interpretation of the consent decree. Nor 
•• 
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did it embody a conclusion that the proposed layoff plan vio-
lated the decree. As this Court has explained before, the 
purpose of a preliminary injunction is much more limited: 
"The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to 
preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial 
on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose, 
and given the haste that is often necessary if those posi-
tions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is cus-
tomarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less 
formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial 
on the merits . . . In light of these considerations, it is 
generally inappropriate for a federal court at the prelimi-
nary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the 
merits." University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S., 
at 395 . 
.The Court's opinion does not even suggest that the District 
Court abused its discretion in concludin that the relative o-
SI Ions o e c1 y an respondents needed to be preserved, 
pending further proceedm s b means of a relimmary m-
junc IOn. n ee , the Court does not address the ques IOn 
at all. The Court concludes, instead, that the proposed lay-
offs would not have violated the consent decree-an issue on 
which neither party has had the opportunity to gather and 
adduce its full evidence. Until that opportunity has been 
given, this Court can only speculate about whether, for ex-
ample, discovery would have produced evidence to show that 
the layoffs violated the city's obligation of good faith under 
the decree. 
2 
The Court also fails properly to address the question 
whether respondents might have shown that the city's fiscal 
crisis justified a modification of the consent decree. This 
Court frequently has recognized the inherent "power of a 
court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to 
changed conditions though it was entered by consent." 
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932); ac-
82-206 & 82-229-DISSENT 
FIREFIGHTERS v. STOTTS 19 
cord, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 
U. S. 424, 437 (1976); United States v. United Shoe Machin-
ery Corp., 391 U. S. 244, 251 (1968); Chrysler Corp. v. 
United States, 316 U. S. 556, 562 (1942). "The source of tlle 
power to modify is of course the fact that an injunction often 
requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and al-
ways a continuing willingness to apply its powers and pro-
cesses on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable re-
lief." System Federation v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 647 
(1961). The test for ruling on a plaintiff's request for a modi-
fication of a consent decree is "whether the change serve[s] to 
effectuate . . . the basic purpose of the original consent de-
cree." Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S., at 562. 12 
Thus, even if respondents could not show that the layoffs 
were "designed to thwart the gains made by blacks" under 
the decree, or that they "violate[ d) the spirit" of the consent 
decree, respondents might have shown that the need for lay-
offs represented an unanticipated "changed circumstance" 
12 Petitioners' and the Court's heavy reliance on United States v. Ar-
mour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971), is misplaced. In that case, the Court 
held that a court should not give a consent decree an interpretation that its 
language cannot sustain even if that interpretation would further the pur-
poses of one of the parties to the decree. The Court, however, did not 
hold that a modification of a consent decree would not be appropriate if the 
purposes of the decree were being frustrated. On the contrary, the Court 
explicitly stated that frustration of purpose "might be a persuasive argu-
ment for modifying the original decree, after full litigation, on a claim that 
unforeseen circumstances now made additional relief desirable to prevent 
the evils aimed at by the original complaint. Here, however, where we 
deal with the construction of an existing consent decree, such an argument 
is out of place." !d., at 681 (footnote omitted). Since Armour, this Court 
has confirmed that its holding in that case indicates only that while "modifi-
cation could be had after a proper hearing proving the need for such modifi-
cation under applicable standards, it would not sanction such modification 
in the guise of construing a consent decree." United States v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223, 236, n. 9 (1975). It is clear, therefore, 
that Armour has no application for determining whether modification of a 
consent decree is appropriate. 
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that would frustrate the purpose of the decree. In any 
event, respondents have not yet had the opportunity to do so 
. · . \- except at the preliminary injunction stage. In deciding to 
b ~ ............ ~~ preserve the status quo, the District Judge was in a particu-
~ ~ ~larly strong positioli10'e\raluate the likelihood of respondents' 
~ \l - l success on the merits; he was the same judge that originally 
- ~ \ .I'-~ issued the decree. That perspective made him especially fa-
~ """- Y. miliar with the "circumstances surrounding the formation of 
~· ~ \'"-1\~ the consent order," United States v. ITT Continental Baking 
· ~ · ,-~ 4-:, Co., 420 U. S. 223, 238 (1975), and uniquely suited to evalu-
• 'I...D ate-upon the necessarily limited information available at 
that early stage of the proceedings-whether respondents 
would be likely to prove that they were entitled to a modifica-
tion. Once again, however, because the propriety of the pre-
liminary injunction is moot, I see no reason to speculate on 
whether respondents might ultimately have made the neces-
sary showing. 
III 
As the preceding discussion has made clear, respondents 
based their request for a preliminary injunction on the Dis-
trict Court's authority to supervise the consent decree be-
tween the city and respondents. Their argument in support 
of the request was grounded exclusively in the terms of that 
decree. The request was not based on an allegation that the 
city's proposed layoffs violated Title VII. Accordingly, the 
propriety of the preliminary injunction is properly deter-
mined exclusively by reference to the authority conferred 
upon the District Court by the consent decree. 
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis of these cases focuses 
on Title VII. The Court concludes that the preliminary in-
junction was improper because it "imposed on the parties as 
an adjunct of settlement something that could not have been 
ordered had the case gone to trial and the plaintiffs pre-
vailed." Ante, at 13. Thus, the Court has chosen to evalu-
ate the propriety of the preliminary injunction by asking 
what type of relief the District Court could have awarded had 
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respondents litigated their Title VII claim and prevailed on 
the merits. Although it is far from clear whether that is the 
right question, 13 it is demonstrably clear that the Court has 
given the wrong answer. 
The Court's analysis of this issue seems to me to be chaotic. 
Had respondents prevailed on their Title VII claims at trial, 
the remedies available would have been those provided by 
§ 706(g), 42 U. S. C. § 2000E-5(g). Under that section, a 
court that determines that an employer has violated Title VII 
may "enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as 
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back 
pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate" (emphasis added). The scope of the relief that 
could have been entered on behalf of respondents had they 
prevailed at trial therefore depends on the nature of relief 
that is "appropriate" in remedying Title VII violations. 
The Court obfuscates its inquiry into this question by fo-
cusing on§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000E-2(h). Section 703 de-
fines the substantive elements of a Title VII violation. Sub-
18 The Court's analysis seems to be premised on the view that a consent 
decree cannot provide relief that could not be obtained at trial. In ad-
dressing the Court's analysis, I do not mean to imply that I accept its 
premise as correct. In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), this 
Court considered whether an affirmative action plan adopted voluntarily 
by an employer violated Title VII because it discriminated against whites. 
In holding that the plan was lawful, the Court stressed that the voluntari-
ness of the plan informed the nature of its inquiry. I d., at 200; see also id., 
at 211 (concurring opinion). Because a consent decree is an agreement 
that is enforceable in court, it has qualities of both voluntariness and com-
pulsion. This Court has explained that Congress intended to encourage 
voluntary settlement of Title VII suits, Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 
450 U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), and cooperative private efforts to eliminate 
the lingering effects of past discrimination. Weber, 432 U. S., at 201-207. 
It is by no means clear, therefore, that the permissible scope of relief avail-
able under a consent decree is the same as could be ordered by a court after 
a finding of liability at trial. 
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section (h) is merely a limitation of the broad definition of 
what constitutes an unlawful employment practice. As the 
Court notes, § 703(h) "provides that it is not an unlawful em-
ployment practice to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, provided that 
such differences are not the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate because of race." Ante, at 10. Thus, subsection (h) 
simply makes clear that application of a bona fide seniority (· 
system will not in itself constitute unlawful disc:rffilinatwn. 1 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 t.J. S. 747 
(1976). Prior cases of this Court make clear, however, that 
§ 703(h) has nothing to do with the type of remedies that are 
appropriate once unlawful discrimination has been found. 
The Court in Franks said: 
"On its face, § 703(h) appears to b~ only a definitional 
provision; as with the other provisions of § 703, subsec-
tion (h) delineates which employment practices are ille-
gal and thereby prohibited and which are not. Section 
703(h) certainly does not expressly purport to qualify or 
proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under the reme-
dial provisions of Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U. S. C. 
§2000e-5(g), in circumstances where an illegal 
dscriminatory practice is found. Further, the legisla-
tive history of § 703(h) plainly negates its reading as 
limiting or qualifying the relief authorized under 
§ 706(g)" (emphasis added and footnote omitted). I d., 
at 758-759. 
See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 
(1977) ("the unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) was to make 
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority sys-
tem would not be unlawful under Title VII"). 
Had respondents' Title VII suit gone to trial and had re-
spondents claimed that the city's seniority system violated 
Title VII, then § 703(h) would have been relevant at the li-
ability stage of the trial. Alternatively, had respondents 
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sought the preliminary injunction on the ground that applica-
tion of the seniority system violated Title VII, then § 703(h) 
would have been relevant in evaluating whether respondents 
were likely to succeed on the merits. But neither of these 
situations is present in these cases. The Court has assumed 
for purposes of its analysis that respondents would have pre-
vailed at the liability stage of their Title VII suit, and 
Franks makes clear that § 703(h) would have been irrelevant 
in determining appropriate relief. Similarly, as I have 
noted, respondents did not seek their preliminary injunction 
on the ground that the city's seniority system was not bona 
fide and that it violated Title VII; they sought the injunction 
based on the terms of the consent decree. Section 703(h) is 
therefore irrelevant in evaluatin whether res ondents · ~ :s. \-.~ ~ 
wou d have prevailed in oht.ainin2" permanent injunctive re-
lief. The city's and the union's claims that the seniority sys"':: 
tern is bona fide are entirely beside the point; unfortunately, 
the Court has missed the point as well. 
In determining the nature of "appropriate" relief under 
§ 706(g), courts have distinguished between individual relief 
and race-conscious class relief. Although overlooked by the 
Court, this distinction is highly relevant here. In a Title VII 
class-action suit of the type brought by respondents, an indi-
vidual is entitled to an individual award of relief only if he can 
establish that he was the victim of discrimination. That re-
quirement grows out of the general equitable principles of 
"make whole" relief; 14 an individual who has suffered no in-
jury is not entitled to an individual award. See Teamsters, 
431 U. S., at 347--348, 364--371. If victimization is shown, 
however, an individual is entitled to whatever retroactive se-
14 The Court's opinion seems to imply that the victimization requirement 
implemented in Teamsters derives from the last sentence of § 706(g). 
Teamsters does not mention that provision, and, as is explained below, the 
provision is not a victimization requirement. The victimization require-
ment simply derives from the principles implicit in the make-whole objec-
tive of individual relief. 
.: ' 
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niority, backpay, and promotions are consistent with the 
statute's goal of making the victim whole. Franks, 424 
U. S., at 762-770. 
In a class action suit under Title VII, the Courts of Appeals 
are unanimously of the view that race-conscious affirmative 
relief is also "appropriate" under § 706(g). 15 See University 
of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 301-302 (opin-
ion of POWELL, J.), 353, n. 28 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, 
WHITE, MARSHALL AND BLACKMUN, JJ.). The purpose of 
16 See e. g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F . 2d 1017, 
1027-1028 (CAl 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enter-
prise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F. 2d 622, 629 (CA2 1974); 
E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. 2d 167, 174-177 (CA31977), 
cert. denied, 438 U. S. 915 (1978); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv-
ice, 665 F. 2d 482, 499 (CA41981); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 
F. 2d 1358, 1363-1366 (CA5 1980); United States v. I.B.E.W., Local No. 
38, 428 F. 2d 144 (CA6), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 943 (1970); United States v. 
City of Chicago, 663 F. 2d 1354 (CA71981) (en bane); Firefighters Institute 
v. City of St. Louis, 616 F. 2d 350, 364 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 
938 (1981); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 553-554 
(CA9), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 984 (1971); United States v. Lee Way Motor 
Freight, Inc., 625 F. 2d 918, 944 (CAlO 1979); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F. 
2d 257, 294 (CADC 1982). 
There is strong support in the legislative history of the 1972 Amend-
ments to Title VII, 86 Stat. 103, that Congress approved the use of race-
conscious remedies under § 706(g). In those amendments, § 706(g) was 
amended to clarify that "affirmative" relief is "not limited to" orders grant-
ing backpay and reinstatement, to make clear that a court may award 
"other equitable relief" that it deems appropriate, and to specify an accrual 
date for backpay. 86 Stat. 107. In re-enacting § 706(g) with its amend-
ments, Congress expressly stated its intention to ratify the prevailing judi-
cial interpretation of that provision. Legislative History of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1844 (Comm. Print 
1972). Prior to passage of the 1972 Amendments, several federal courts 
had approved race-conscious action to remedy the effects of employment 
discrimination. See e. g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 
2d, at 553-554; United States v. I.B.E.W., Local No . 38, 428 F. 2d, at 
149-150; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F . 2d 123 
(CA8 1969); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5 
1969) . 
. ' 
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such relief is not to make whole any particular individual, but 
rather to remedy the present class-wide effects of the past 
discrimination. Because the discrimination sought to be al-
leviated by race-conscious relief is discrimination against a 
class, rather than against identified members of the class, 
such relief is provided to the class as a whole rather than to 
its individual members. The relief can take many forms, but 
it frequently imposes percentages-such as those contained 
in the decree between the city and respondents-that require 
race to be taken into account when an employer hires or pro-
motes employees. The distinguishing feature of race-con-
scious relief is that no individual member of the disad-
vantaged class has a claim to it, and individual beneficiaries 
of the relief need not show that they were themselves victims 
of the discrimination for which the relief was granted. 
In the instant case, respondents' request for a preliminary 
injunction did not include a request for individual awards of 
retroactive seniority-and the District Court did not make 
any such awards. Rather, the District Court order merely 
required the city to conduct its layoffs in a race-conscious 
manner; specifically, the preliminary injunction prohibited 
the city from conducting layoffs that would "decrease the 
percentage of black[s]" in certain job categories. The city 
remained free to lay off any individual black so long as the 
percentage of black representation was maintained. As I 
have explained, race-conscious remedies are commonly 
awarded in 'htle VII suits and the Court offers no reason that 
c a1ms a ria. 
Because the preliminary injunction awarded only race-con-
scious relief to the class as a whole, the Court's focus on the 
standard that Franks and Teamsters established for award-
ing individual relief is misdirected. Ironically, however, the 
Court's conclusion that the preliminary injunction ordered 
something that could not have been awarded at trial is wrong 
b~c..~~~ . 
kCAU. ~r~~;~ ~~* 
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even under the Franks and Teamsters analysis applied by 
the Court. As the Court points out, th.e consent decree 
arose out of a Title VII suit brought by respondents alleging 
that the city had engaged in a pattern and practice of dis-
crimination against members of the plaintiff class. Mr. 
Stotts, the named plaintiff, claimed that he and the class 
members that he represented had been denied promotions 
solely because of race, and that because of that discrimina-
tion, he and other members of the class had been denied their 
rightful rank in the Memphis Fire Department. See Com-
plaint of Respondents in No. 82-229, ~~9 and 10, App. 10. 
Had respondent's case actually proceeded to trial, it would 
have involved the now familiar two-stage procedure estab-
lished in Teamsters and Franks. The first stage would be a 
trial to determine whether the city had engaged in unlawful 
discrimination; if so, the case would proceed to the second 
stage, during which the individual members of the class 
would have the opportunity to establish that they were vic-
tims of discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 371, 375. 
The Court itself correctly indicates: "If individual members of 
a plaintiff class demonstrate that they have been actual vic-
tims of the discriminatory practice, they may be awarded 
competitive seniority and given their rightful place on the se-
niority roster." Ante, at 12. Were respondents to prevail 
at trial on their claims of discrimination, therefore, they 
might have obtained whatever "seniority award" the District 
Court's preliminary injunction gave them. Thus, the 
Court's conclusion is refuted by its own logic and by the very 
cases on which it relies to come to its result. 
For reasons never explained, the Court's opinion has fo-
cused entirely on what respondents have actually shown, in-
stead of what they might have shown had they proceeded to 
trial. It is absurd, however, to fault respondents for failing 
to show "that any of the blacks protected from layoff had 
been a victim of discrimination," ante, at 13, for the simple 
reason that the claims on which such a showing would have 
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been made never went to trial. The whole point of the con-
sent decree in this case-and indeed the point of most Title 
VII consent decrees-is to avoid the time and expense of liti-
gating the question of liability and identifying the victims of 
discrimination. Because the city has not conceded that it en-
gaged in any unlawful discrimination, all the relief agreed to 
in this consent decree-including the promotions and 
backpay granted to specific individuals-was relief that went 
to persons never determined to be actual victims. The 
Court's logic makes all such relief inappropriate and com-
pletely destroys the incentives for entering into consent de-
crees. The Court today has altogether reversed its past po-
sition that "Congress expressed a strong preference for 
encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimina-
tion claims." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 
79, 88, n. 14 (1981); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 u. s. 36, 44 (1974). 
As a final point, to the extent that the Court's invalidation 
of the preliminary injunction relies on the last sentence of 
§ 706(g), that reliance is misplaced. That sentence merely 
prevents a court under certain circumstances from awarding 
individual relief: "No order of the court shall require the . . . 
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an em-
ployee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such indi-
vidual was . . . refused employment or advancement or was 
suspended or discharged for any reason other than dis-
crimination" in violation of Title VII: This provision ad-
dresses the case where a violation of Title VII has been 
shown, but the employer can show that a particular individ-
ual would not have received the job, promotion or reinstate-
ment even in the absence of discrimination, that is, a lawful 
reason justified the employment decision. Day v. Mathews, 
530 F. 2d 1083, 1085 (CADC 1976); Patterson v. Greenwood 
School District 50, 696 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA4 1982); King v. La-
borers Int'l Union, Local No. 818, 443 F. 2d 273, 278-279 
(CA6 1971). See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the 
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Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 
82 Colum. L. Rev. 292 (1982). The sentence, for example, 
prevents a court from granting relief where an employment 
decision is based in part upon race, but where the applicant is 
unqualified for the job for non-discriminatory reasons. 16 In 
that sense, the section provides an affirmative defense for an 
employer to protect him from being ordered to hire someone 
unqualified for the job. This provision has nothing to do 
with limits on class-wide race-conscious relief. 17 To the ex-
16 In E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, the Third Circuit 
properly analyzed the section as follows: 
"The last sentence in § 706(g) must be read in light of the settled con-
struction of the rest of the section. That settled construction is that once a 
prima facie showing is made that an employer has engaged in a practice 
which violates Title VII, the burden shifts to it to prove that there is a 
benign justification or explanation. The last sentence of § 706(g) says pre-
cisely that. Obviously, an employer can meet an individual charge by 
showing that although that individual was a member of the disadvantaged 
class he was also a thief, or a drunk or an incompetent, and was for such a 
reason denied employment or promotion. But the sentence does not speak 
at all to the showing that must be made by individual suitors, or class rep-
resentatives on behalf of class members, or the EEOC on behalf of class 
members. The sentence merely preserves the employer's defense that the 
non-hire, discharge, or non-promotion was for a cause other than dis-
crimination" (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 556 F. 2d, at 176. 
17 The legislative history confirms this view. What is now 706(g) origi-
nated as § 707(e) in H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The original 
version prevented a court from granting relief to someone that had been 
refused employment, denied promotion, or discharged "for cause." The 
"for cause" provision clearly referred to what an employer must show to 
establish that a particular individual should not be given relief. That lan-
guage was amended by replacing "for cause" with "for any reason other 
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin," 
which was the version of the sentence as passed by the House. The au-
thor of the original version and of the amendment explained the meaning of 
the amendment: 
"[T]he purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here the court, for 
example, cannot find any violation of the act which is based on facts 
other-and I emphasize 'other'-than discrimination on the grounds of 
race, color, religion, or national origin. The discharge might be based, for 
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tent that the Court suggests otherwise, the Court is simply 
wrong. 
IV 
By dissenting in this case, I do not mean glibly to suggest 
that the District Court's preliminary injunction necessarily 
was correct. Because it seems that the affected whites have 
no contractual rights that were breached by the city's modi-
fied layoff plan, the effect of the preliminary injunction was 
to shift the pain of the city's fiscal crisis on to innocent em-
ployees. This Court has recognized before the difficulty of 
reconciling competing claims of innocent employees who 
themselves are neither the perpetrators of discrimination nor 
the victims of it. "In devising and implementing remedies 
under Title VII, no less than in formulating any equitable de-
cree, a court must draw on the 'qualities of mercy and prac-
ticality [that] have made equity the instrument for nice ad-
justment and reconciliation between the public interest and 
private needs as well as between competing private claims.'" 
Teamsters, 431 U. 8., at 375, quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 
321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944). If the District Court's pre-
liminary injunction was proper, it was because it accurately 
assessed the equities in what was admittedly a zero-sum situ-
ation. If it was wrong, it was because a less painful way of 
reconciling the competing claims was within the court's 
power. In either case, the propriety of the action had noth-
ing whatsoever to do with § 703(h) or with the last sentence of 
§ 706(g). 
example, on incompetence or a morals charge or theft, but the court can 
only consider charges based on race, color, religion, or national origin. 
That is the purpose of this amendment." 110 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964) (re-
marks of Rep. Geller). 
The only change in this sentence that took place in the Senate was the addi-
tion of "sex" as an illegitimate basis for discrimination ("sex" had uninten-
tionally been omitted from the House version). It is clear, therefore, that 
the sentence is relevant only in determining individual relief, and does not 
affect a court's authority to mandate race-conscious affirmative relief to 
remedy past discrimination. 
- 30 
I dissent. 
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Dear Byron: 
The substantial revisions effected by your recirculation of 
March 29 of course'will prompt a revision of my dissent. In 
view of the fact that Sandra has now indicated that she will 
write in concurrence, I shall defer my revision until her con-
currence is circulated. 
This means that Bill Rehnquist will be held up in his dis-
sent in No. 83-665 (and in No. 83-625?) because he twice has 
cited Stotts in that dissent. 
Justice White 
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CARL W. STOTTS ET AL. 
MEMPHIS FIRE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
CARL w. STOTTS, ETC.' ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1984] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. 
The various views presented in the opinions in this case re-
flect the unusual procedural posture of the case and the diffi-
culties inherent in allocating the burdens of recession and fis-
cal austerity. I concur in the Court's treatment of these 
difficult issues, and write separately to reflect my under-
standing of what the Court holds today. 
I 
To appreciate the Court's disposition of the mootness issue, 
it is necessary to place this case in its complete procedural 
perspective. The parties agree that the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals were presented with a "case or contro-
versy" in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the Con-
stitution. Respondents, as trial-plaintiffs, initiated the dis-
pute, asking the District Court preliminarily to enjoin the 
City from reducing the percentage of minority employees in 
various job classifications within the Fire Department. Pe-
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titioners actively opposed that motion, arguing that respond-
ents had waived any right to such relief in the consent decree 
itself and, in any event, that the reductions-in-force were 
bona fide applications of the citywide seniority system. 
When the District Court held against them, petitioners fol-
lowed the usual course of obeying the injunction and pros-
ecuting an appeal. They were, however, unsuccessful on 
that appeal. 
Respondents now claim that the case has become moot on 
certiorari to this Court. The recession is over, the employ-
ees who were laid off or demoted have been restored to their 
former jobs, and petitioners apparently have no current need 
to make seniority-based layoffs. The res judicata effects of 
the District Court's order can be eliminated by the Court's 
usual practice of vacating the decision below and remanding 
with instructions to dismiss. See United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950). Thus, respond-
ents conclude that the validity of the preliminary injunction is 
no longer an issue of practical significance and the case can be 
dismissed as moot. See Brief of Respondents 26--28. 
I agree with the Court that petitioners and respondents 
continue to wage a controversy that would not be resolved by 
merely vacating the preliminary injunction. As a result of 
the District Court's order, several black employees have 
more seniority for purposes of future job decisions and enti-
tlements than they otherwise would have. This added se-
niority gives them an increased expectation of future promo-
tion, an increased priority in bidding on certain jobs and job 
transfers, and an increased protection from future layoffs. 
These individuals, who are members of the respondent class, 
have not waived their increased seniority benefits. There-
fore, petitioners have a significant interest in determining 
those individuals' claims in the very litigation in which they 
were originally won. As the Court of Appeals noted, if peti-
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tioner-employer does not vigorously defend the implementa-
tion of the seniority system, it will have to cope with deteri-
oration in employee morale, labor unrest, and reduced 
productivity. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 
F. 2d 541, 555 and n. 12 (CA() 1982); see also Ford Motor Co. 
v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 229 (1982). Likewise, if petitioner-
union accedes to discriminatory employment actions, it will 
lose both the confidence of its members and bargaining lever-
age in the determination of who should ultimately bear the 
burden of the past (and future) fiscal shortages. See ante, at 
7, and n. 5. Perhaps this explains why, in respondents' 
words, "the city and union have expended substantial time 
and effort ... in [an] appeal which can win no possible relief 
for the individuals on whose behalf it has ostensibly been pur-
sued." Brief for Respondents 44. 
When collateral effects of a dispute remain and continue to 
affect the relationship of litigants, 1 the case is not moot. 
See, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 
747, 755-757 (1976); Super Tire Engineering Co. v. 
McCorkle, 416 U. S. 115, 121-125 (1974); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U. S. 368, 375-376 (1963). In such cases, the Court does 
not hesitate to provide trial defendants with "a definitive dis-
position of their objections" on appeal, Pasadena City Bd. 
of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 440 (1976), because 
vacating the res judicata effects of the decision would not 
'This case is distinguishable from University of Texas v. Camenisch, 
451 U. S. 390 (1981), where the Court found that a petitioner's objections 
to a preliminary injunction, which required it to pay for the respondent's 
sign-language interpreter, were moot. In Camenisch, the propriety of is-
suing the preliminary injunction was really no longer of concern to the par-
ties, and the real issue-who should pay for the interpreter-was better 
handled in a separate proceeding. Id., at 394-398. In this case, because 
the parties are in an ongoing relationship, they have a continuing interest 
in the propriety of the preliminary relief itself. Camenisch expressly 
distinguishes cases like this one, where the parties retain "a legally cogni-
zable interest in the determination whether the preliminary injunction was 
properly granted[.]" Id., at 394; see also id., at 397, and n. 2. 
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bring the controversy to a close. See Note, Mootness on Ap-
peal in the Supreme Court, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672, 1677-1687 
(1970). As the Court wisely notes, "[litigants] cannot invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court ... and then insulate [the 
effects of that court's] ruling .from appellate review by claim-
ing that they are no longer interested in the matter." Ante, 
at 9. 
II 
My understanding of the Court's holding on the merits also 
is aided by a review of the place this case takes in the history 
of the parties' litigation. The city entered into a consent de-
cree with respondents, agreeing to certain hiring and promo-
tional goals, backpay awards, and individual promotions. 
The city was party both to another consent decree and to an 
agreement with the union concerning application of the se-
niority system at the time it made these concessions. Re-
spondents did not seek the union's participation in the negoti-
ation of their consent decree with the city, did not include the 
seniority system as a subject of negotiation, and waived all 
rights to seek further relief. When the current dispute 
arose, the District Court rejected respondents' allegation 
that the seniority system had been adopted or applied with 
any discriminatory animus. It held, however, that "modifi-
cation" was appropriate because of the seniority system's dis-
criminatory effects. Under these circumstances, the Court's 
conclusion that the District Court had no authority to order 
maintenance of racial percentages in the Department is, in 
my view, inescapable. 
Had respondents presented a plausible case of discrimina-
tory animus in the adoption or application of the seniority 
system, then the Court would be hard pressed to consider en-
try of the preliminary injunction an abuse of discretion. But 
that is not what happened here. To the contrary, the Dis-
trict Court rejected the claim of discriminatory animus, and 
the Court of Appeals did not disagree. Furthermore, the 
District Court's erroneous conclusion to the contrary, main-
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tenance of racial balance in the Department could not be jus-
tified as a correction of an employment policy with an unlaw-
ful disproportionate impact. Title VII affirmatively protects 
bona fide seniority systems, including those with discrimina-
tory effects on minorities. . See American Tobacco Co. v. 
Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 65 (1982); Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977). 
Therefore, the preliminary injunction could only be justi-
fied as a reasonable interpretation of the consent decree or as 
a permissible exercise of the District Court's authority to 
modify that consent decree. Neither justification was 
present here. For the reasons stated by the Court, ante, at 
11-13, and JUSTICE STEVENS, post, at 3, the consent decree 
itself cannot fairly be interpreted to bar use of the seniority 
policy or to require maintenance of racial balances previously 
achieved in the event layoffs became necessary. Nor can a 
district court unilaterally modify a consent decree to provide 
retroactive relief that abrogates legitimate expectations of 
other employees and applicants. Neither the federal antidis-
crimination laws nor the inherent powers of equity authorize 
courts to require an employer to adjust racial imbalances in 
this way; indeed, they generally proscribe courts from doing 
so. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-207 
(1979); Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, supra, 
427 U. S., at 43&-438. A court may not grant preferential 
treatment to any individual or group simply because the 
group to which they belong is adversely affected by a bona 
fide seniority system. Rather, a court may use its remedial 
powers, including its power to modify a consent decree, only 
to prevent future violations and to compensate identified vic-
tims of unlawful discrimination. See Teamsters v. United 
States, supra, at 367-371; Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 
267, 28~281 (1977); see also University of California Re-
gents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 307-309, and n. 44 (POWELL, 
J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Even when its 
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award preferential treatment only after carefully balancing 
the competing interests of discriminatees, innocent employ-
ees, and the employer. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 
supra, 458 U. S., at 239-240; Teamsters v. United States, 
supra, at 371-376. In sho~, no matter how significant the 
change in circumstance, a district court cannot unilaterally 
modify a consent decree to adjust racial balances in the way 
the District Court did here. 2 
To be sure, in 1980, respondents could have gone to trial 
and established illegal discrimination in the Department's 
past hiring practices, identified its specific victims, and possi-
bly obtained retroactive seniority for those individuals. Al-
ternatively, in 1980, in negotiating the consent decree, re-
spondents could have sought the participation of the union, 3 
negotiated the identities of the specific victims with the union 
and employer, and possibly obtained limited forms of retroac-
tive relief. But respondents did none of these things. They 
chose to avoid the costs and hazards of litigating their claims. 
They negotiated with the employer without inviting the 
union's participation. They entered into a consent decree 
without establishing any specific victim's identity. And, 
most importantly, they waived their right to seek further re-
lief. To allow respondents to obtain relief properly reserved 
for only identified victims, or to prove their victim status 
now, would undermine the certainty of obligation that is con-
dition precedent to employers' acceptance of, and unions' con-
sent to, employment discrimination settlements. See Steel-
2 Unlike the dissenters and JusTICE STEVENS, I find persuasive the 
Court's reasons for holding Title VII relevant to analysis of the modifica-
tion issue, see ante, at 13-14, and n. 12, and the Court's application of Title 
VII's provisions to the facts of the present controversy. 
3 "Absent a judicial determination, ... the Company[] cannot alter the 
collective bargaining agreement without the Union's consent." W. R . 
Grace & Co . v. Local 759, - U. S. -,- (1983). Thus, if innocent 
employees are to be required to make any sacrifices in the final consent 
decree, they must be represented and have had full participation rights in 
the negotiation process. 
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workers v. Weber, 443 U. S., at 211 (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring) (employers enter into settlements to avoid back 
pay responsibilities and to reduce disparate impact claims). 
Modifications requiring maintenance of racial balance would 
not encourage valid settlements4 of employment discrimina-
tion cases. They would impede them. Thus, when the 
Court states that this preferential relief could not have been 
awarded even had this case gone to trial, see ante, at 17, it is 
holding respondents to the bargain they struck during the 
consent decree negotiations in 1980 and thereby furthering 
the statutory policy of voluntary settlement. See Carsons 
v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 88, and n. 14 (1981). 
In short, the Court effectively applies the criteria tradi-
tionally applicable to the review of preliminary injunctions. 
See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975). 
When the Court disapproves the preliminary injunction is-
sued in this case, it does so because respondents had no 
chance of succeeding on the merits of their claim. The Dis-
trict Court had no authority to order the Department to 
maintain its current racial balance or to provide preferential 
treatment to blacks. It therefore abused its discretion. On 
this understanding, I ~r in the tleeision Iendered today. " 1 rv 1 1 ~ 
01 "t-"-<LOfJ•tf.ll>•v 
'The policy favoring voluntary settlement does not, of course, counte-
nance unlawful discrimination against existing employees or applicants. 
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 
278-296 (1976) (Title VII and 42 U. S. C. § 1981 prohibit discrimination 
against whites as well as blacks); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 
208-209 (1979) (listing attributes that would make affirmative action plan 
impermissible); cf. id., at 215 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) ("seniority is not 
in issue because the craft training program is new and does not involve an 
abrogation of pre-existing seniority rights"). 
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George J?. lflill 
We Must Be 
Colo1~blind 
Consider Vernon Jordan's cab crite-
rion. Jordan says: put Brad Rey11olds on 
one street comer and me on the other. 
Let us both hail a cab, and see at which 
comer the cab stops. Jordan is black; 
Reynolds, assistant attorney general for 
civil rights, is white; and Jordan is right· 
racism remains. He is wrong in arguing 
that this justifies government policies 
preferring one race. 
Jordan recently attacked Reynolds 
for a spe€ch in which Reynolds praised 
.. the principle that was until recenlly the 
cardinal tenet of the civil rights move-
ment: that the use of race to justify 
treating individuals differently can 
never be legitimate. Jordan called the 
· administration in which Reynolds 
serves hostile "to black people and · to 
. the very evncept of a decent society."_· 
. WeU. In 1896, the. Supreme Court held 
that Mr. Plessy, who was one-€ighth 
black, could be excluded by law .. from 
"white" railroad carriages. Jti~tice ' John 
M. Harlan dissented: "Our Constitution 
is color blind._ .. The law ... takes no ac-
CO\illt of ... color." In 1954, Thurgood 
MarshaU, the NAACP's lawyer in the 
school cases, said that alJ anyone could 
reasonably want is that "children be as-
signed a school without regard to race or 
· color." In debate about the 1964 Civil -
Rights Act, Hubert Humphrey said the ·· 
act "would prohibit preferential .treat-
ment for any particular group.". , _. 
. Until the late 1%05, Harlan's dissent . 
expressed the ciVil rights movement's cis~ -.. 
piration. Then that movement began · 
seeking racial entitlements. As Alexander 
Bickel wrot;;, suddenly Americans were 
supposed to unlearn the lesson that dis-
crimination on tile basis of race is inher-
ently wroog, and to learn ''that this is oot 
a matter of fundaR<entaJ principle but 
only a matter of whose OX is gored:'' . ·: · . 
II Harlan was right, .Reynolds isright 
and Jordan is wrong. II Marshall was · 
right in 1954, he is wrong now when he 
supports forced bu.Sing of children as-
signed to schools on the basis of skin pig-
mentation. If Humphrey was right iii 
1964, the civil rights movement is v.rrong . 
. in 1983. For associating himself v.~th Har-
lan, 'Marshall and Humphrey, Heynolds 
is caJJed a racist. But the ferocity of the · 
atlacks does not disguise the apostasy of 
tile attackers, or drown out tJ1is insistent 
question: by what criteria wiU those who 
now oppose a colorblind legal code say 































d1scnmmatea agains( blacks, it nee<is a 
"temporary period" of "positive discrimi-
nation" favoring blacks. But the period 
will be perpetual. Jordan .says tl<e law 
cannot be raciaUy neutral until "society" 
is neutral And proof of society's neutral-
ity will . be-what? Inevitably the crite-
rion wiU be equality of attainment. , 
The NAACP's Benjamin Hooks cites 
the paucity of blacks on corporate 
boards and in u'niversity presidencies 
and says reverse discrimination will be 
needed until America "begins to treat 
all of its citizens alike." Inevitably, 
equal outcomes will be considered the 
only proof of equal "treatment.": 
Jordan says: "Colorb!indness makes 
sense in a context of a society that has al-
ready dismantled its structures of dis-
crinlination. Racial neutrality !'Rakes 
sense in the context of a society in which 
advantage does not accrue to any given 
race." But the fact that "advantage" ac-
crues unevenly among the races is Hot 
proof of discriminatory "structures," aFld 
certainly does not justify intentional dis-
crimination by race_-based laws. 
Policy certainly should strive to over:. 
come what Jordan caJis "the ravages of. 
unequal history." But not aU values 
should be sacrificed to that. A thoroughly 
integrated society is desirable; a color-
blind legal code is, as the Civil rights 
movement formerly said, mandatory. 
Jordan rightly says that the wrong done 
to past geoorations of blacks by state-
sanctioned discrimination was directed 
against a caste, not individ'uals. He 
wrongly says that that means the "reme-
dy" can properly be a group remedy in- · 
volving racial entitlements for persons wJio· 
are not victims of such discrimination and 
injuring whites who are not guilty of dis-
crimination. 'The fact that a contemporary 
injury to whites-may be symmetrical with 
a past injury to blocks does not dignify the 
· injurious policy as a "remedy." 
Jordan says racial preference for blacks 
does not cause "undue hardship" for ilie 
white majority. That is true in the sense 
that the injury is done to a relatively few 
individuals. But what is iiredeemably.per-
nicious about raciaUy based government' 
action is precisely that it teaches disregard . 
for individuals, and teaches the doctrine · 
that rights do not inhere in individuals but' 
derive frOO< race membership. 
To my friend, Vernon Jordan, I ask:, 
do policies that legitimize racial think- . 
ing, iliat taint black achievements and 
stigmatize blacks as wards of the state, ~ 
in perpetuity, hasten the day when cab- · 
drivers will be colorblind?· 
J 
/ 
Edwin M. Yo.der ]r. \\ 
Another Blunder 
0~ Civil Rights 
The Reagan White House, according to a 
report by Juan Williams of The Post, was 
"taken aback by the furor" over the presi-
dent's proposed purge of the U.S. Civil 
Rights Commission. 
The Reagan White House is easily "taken 
aback," especially by the hostile reaction to 
symbolic blunders in civil-rights policy. The 
summary discharge of three commission 
members will incidentally leave it all white 
except for its Reagan-appointed chairman, 
Clarence Pendleton. That is vividly symbol-
ic, but it is not substantively important. 
In fact, it could have the ironic result of 
restoring to the Civil Rights Commission a 
notice and prestige it has forfeited by 
chronic intemperance and irrelevance. Con-
. gress created the commission in 1957 to 
document shortcomings in equal protecction. 
Its early work, especially through investiga-
tions by state advisory bodies, was helpful 
and occasionally distinguished. Since then, 
however, the commission has become a · 
buzzing gadf1y. 
President Reagan will no doubt be "taken 
aback" when his attempt to swat a pest 
borne in silence by other presidents adds to 
the impression that he is hostile to black in-
terests. But it's the Voting Rights renewal 
story all over again. 
Two years ago, the president dithered 
while Congress debated the issue of renew-
ing and strengthening the 1965 act. When 
Reagan finally weighed in with an opinion, . 
renewal was a fait accompli; nothing was left" 
to be decided. , . 
. Reagan's dilatoriness on the voting rights 
issue was, as The Post story interestingly 
li notes, matched by that of the Civil Rights 
Commission. While the commission investi-
' gated issues of little interest to the great 
mass of underemployed blacks (e.g., ini- . 
nority employment on TV networks and in 
high-tech industry), it failed to file a report 
on voting rights on time. 
At least two of the three new Reagan 
nominees to the commission-Morris 
Abram and John H. Bunzel-have long 
records of civil-rights activism, excellent as 
such records were measured before the divi-
sive issue of "reverse discrimination" intrud-
ed. Their skepticism of that double-edged 
remedy for racial wrongs, which drew the 
notice of Reagan White House officials, will 
probably be the point of attack upon them. 
It will need to be vigorously rebuffed. 
For apart from insensitivity to the sym-
bolic aspect of civil rights, the Reagan ad- · 
ministration's Achilles' heel has been its- fa11--
ure to clarify the crucial differepce between -~ 
"affirmative action" (which is perfectly con-
sistent with color-blindness in the law) and 
"reverse discrimination" (which is not). 
Color-blindness-the term was made 
memorable by the first Justice Harlan in his 
heroic dissent in Plessy u. Ferguson-is a 
legal term of art of specific meaning. It is .not 
the rigid pretense that embedded racial 
wrongs never require nor justify speciar <;on.~ :. 
cern. Color-blindness instead condemns· 
legal remedies that purport to redress;past: 
wrongs by creating new categories of firs~-: : 
and second-class citizenship. ··- ·· 
There is some hope that the new corrimis! : 
sion members, if confirmed, may correct1be ' · 
confusion. Neither Abram nor Bunzel, ·as a 
May 25 interview with the press shows., · is 
confused about these critical distinctions QO.r 
intimidated · by the campaign to mu?d;r 
them, In Bunzel's words, the distinctiop qe-
tween affirmative action and reverse ' a is: 
crimination "is the distinction between com:; 
pensatory action ... and racially prefen:;n.tiai 
treatment." .,. .; •· ' 
Examples of legitimate affirmative acti,pn' 
-ranging from programs like Head Start· 
and Upward Bound to the recognitiort .of · 
race as one (of many) "pluses" in consider-. 
ing a college application-abound. No .such 
measures require invidious categorization of 
other persons or groups. · ~, 
Affirmative action, in short, needs rescu-
ing from the polemical distortions of ·\)o:th 
friends and foes who slyly or ignorantly ' 
equate it with reverse discrimination- And 
quota systems. . ·: · .. 
Can the White House manage the rescue 
effort? One occasionally has the impression 
that no one at 1600 Pennsylvanian Ave., in-
cluding the president, has followed the un-
folding civil-rights debate since about 1970. 
That may explain why the White House is 
often "taken aback" by the reaction to 
maneuvers that others see as blunders. • 
.... 
I , .. 
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